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INTRODUCTION 
In light of the recent financial crisis, the need for better regulation in 
capital markets is painfully clear. The crisis has challenged the 
longstanding assumption that, on its own, the market can rein in short-
term opportunistic behavior and even outright fraud, while maximizing 
societal wealth in the long term. As legal scholars and policymakers 
blame rampant flexibility of capital markets for the crisis, they begin to 
advocate for greater restrictions and monitoring on investment and lend-
ing. They hope that the United States government’s rescue plan will not 
only help reactivate the economy, but also provide an opportunity to re-
shape financial markets to more clearly benefit society at large. In the 
midst of this economic collapse, however, the assumption that unbridled 
flexibility is the optimal form for the labor market has gone largely un-
challenged, despite a pervasive sense of job insecurity, gloomy forecasts 
about impending job losses, and record unemployment levels. 
That labor flexibility has not lost its appeal in the face of the labor 
market meltdown is a testimony to the virtues associated with it by 
many scholars and policy-makers. In good times, many economists he-
ralded little or no labor market regulation as the engine for job creation, 
2009] LABOR FLEXIBILITY 45 
greater participation of women and youths in the workforce, and lower 
unemployment levels. Flexibility meant a regime of employment at will, 
where the government imposed no restrictions on hiring, firing or work-
ing conditions. Rather, employers and workers were free to choose 
terms that were convenient for them. 
This understanding of flexibility, however, overlooks one of the main 
lessons of twentieth-century American legal scholarship, namely the 
idea that legal rights are relational and not absolute. This regime of la-
bor flexibility gave unparalleled strength to employers. It also meant 
high wages for some employees. With flexibility, however, also came 
the rise of a contingent workforce and precarious jobs. Labor flexibility 
came to mean jobs below the living wage, degrading working condi-
tions, and informal, undocumented jobs where agreed-upon contract 
terms were honored in the breach. 
In this Article, I argue that labor flexibility involves the interests of 
both employers and employees, which may coincide but are often in 
tension. Flexibility for one of the parties in the employment relationship 
can indeed translate into rigidity for the other party. In good times, the 
asymmetrical character of labor flexibility may go unnoticed, but in bad 
times, it becomes all too clear that employers and employees experience 
labor flexibility differently. When firms begin to cut wages or fire en 
masse to reduce costs, this flexibility for employers looks like nothing 
more than insecurity for employees. 
I argue that the dominant understanding of labor flexibility—a binary 
between flexibility and rigidity—is misguided and should be revised. 
This is particularly important as the one-sided conception of labor flex-
ibility has been translated into influential legal reform projects world-
wide through the policy recommendations of the World Bank and other 
international financial institutions. To illustrate the shortcomings of the 
dominant conception of labor flexibility, I turn to the highly influential 
World Bank project, “Doing Business” (DB).1 The Doing Business re-
ports propose legal “best practices” in labor and employment regulation, 
heralding so-called labor law “flexibility” as a recipe for economic de-
velopment. Based on a set of indicators that correlate labor “flexibility” 
with better economic performance, the reports advise countries around 
the world to strip down their labor regulations into flexible ones. 
DB’s assessment of labor law flexibility contains a number of very 
serious omissions that seem to stem from a flawed understanding of 
regulation. I demonstrate that the Doing Business indicators fail to con-
sider the full range of legal sources by relying primarily on the written 
                                                          
1. The Doing Business Project maintains an archive of Doing Business reports on its website 
at http://www.doingbusiness.org/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2009). 
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law, while remaining blind to the reality of law in action and to wide-
spread economic informality. On the whole, Doing Business promotes a 
conception of legal flexibility that fails to capture the insight that flex-
ibility for some may mean rigidity for others. 
In contrast to the dominant flexibility-rigidity conception, I develop 
an alternative framework that unpacks the concept of labor flexibility by 
assessing the respective entitlements of employers and employees in the 
labor market. The framework I propose shows the need for two analyti-
cal steps that are currently missing in the literature. First, it is necessary 
to undertake a doctrinal assessment of the respective rights, duties, and 
privileges of the different players in the labor market. We need to ask: 
flexible for whom? Second, we need to pay attention to the social links 
between the legal regime and the realities of economic life, with particu-
lar attention to the differences between the formal and informal eco-
nomic sectors. 
Based on this analysis, I lay out a typology of three different labor 
regimes that combine flexibility and rigidity in different ways and can 
coexist within the same economy and the same country. These regimes, 
which I call the employee-friendly, employer-friendly, and free-for-all 
regimes, describe the full range of legal entitlements available to em-
ployers and employees in the employment relationship. They underpin 
different sectors of the economy, which vary in size and in contribution 
to a country’s overall economic performance. 
This framework provides a better comparative description of coun-
tries’ current labor regimes, as well as their size and distribution in the 
economy. It can serve as a better lens through which to analyze the la-
bor regimes that underpin successful development experiences. It could, 
therefore, also provide better guidance for labor regulatory strategies. 
I should note that this Article is not a global defense of protections of 
labor regulation as they currently exist. The point is that we need to 
move beyond the flexibility/rigidity framework that has dominated 
analysis of labor regulation’s relationship to development. My Article 
takes seriously the idea that we can learn about the relationship between 
labor regimes and economic performance through comparison, but chal-
lenges DB’s methodology and the “one size fits all” prescriptions that 
flow from it. Not only because the legal reform recommendations may 
expend countries’ scarce economic and political capital without deliver-
ing, but also because they may prevent countries from engaging in a 
more accurate analysis of their own regulation, from experimenting with 
the gamut of imaginable institutional arrangements to designing reforms 
that respond to their context and to their own compromises and aspira-
tions. 
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Part I of this Article discusses the theoretical and empirical back-
ground of the labor regulation debates. Part II turns to the Doing Busi-
ness report’s methodology and proposals. Part III critiques the proble-
matic assumptions that the Doing Business authors make about 
employment regulation, which both overstate and understate the role of 
law in economic performance. Part IV argues for the development of a 
new approach in assessing flexibility in labor and employment regula-
tion and the relationship between flexible labor regulation and economic 
growth. To this effect, Part IV also offers a typology of labor law re-
gimes that I believe can help us move in a more helpful direction in the 
debates on comparative labor law regulation. Specifically, I develop 
three ideal types that can help generate a contextually thicker and ana-
lytically more accurate description of labor law regimes. Part V con-
cludes by applying this alternative framework and highlighting the les-
sons for legal and policy analysis in the law and development 
community. 
I. THE DEBATE OVER LABOR MARKET INSTITUTIONS 
Law’s relevance in countries’ economic development is widely ac-
cepted in the academic and policymaking communities.2 Law matters. 
How it matters, however, is hotly debated.3 In recent years, one of the 
areas where this debate has been particularly intense is labor and em-
ployment law.4 At the height of enthusiasm for free markets in devel-
opment theory, the choice was seen as one between regulation and dere-
                                                          
2. See THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 3, 7–9 (David 
M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006). There is a growing consensus in the development eco-
nomics literature about the relevance of institutions, and particularly legal institutions in econom-
ic development. See, e.g., DOUGLASS NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990); WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2002: 
BUILDING INSTITUTIONS FOR MARKETS (2002); Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson & James A. 
Robinson, The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation, 91 
AM. ECON. REV. 1369 (2001); Dani Rodrik, Arvind Subramanian & Francesco Trebbi, Institu-
tions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Develop-
ment, 9 J. ECON. GROWTH 131 (2004). 
3. See Kevin E. Davis & Michael J. Trebilcock, The Relationship Between Law and Devel-
opment: Optimists Versus Skeptics, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 895, 917–19 (2008). Davis and Trebil-
cock frame the debate as one where scholars either believe that law matters or not. But the debate 
can be more accurately characterized as one where scholars disagree not about whether law mat-
ters, but about how law matters. The optimism and skepticism they describe is really about partic-
ular assumptions about law and modes of legal intervention, not about law’s ability to impact so-
cial behavior in general or about its potential to foster development. 
4. For examples of labor law scholarship analyzing the debate about labor markets regulation, 
see SIMON DEAKIN & FRANK WILKINSON, THE LAW OF THE LABOUR MARKET: 
INDUSTRIALIZATION, EMPLOYMENT AND LEGAL EVOLUTION 2–4, 303–42 (2005); Richard B. 
Freeman, Labour Market Institutions Without Blinders: The Debate over Flexibility and Labour 
Market Performance, 19 INT’L ECON. J. 129, 129–30 (2005). 
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gulation.5 Today, as scholars recognize the need for regulation in the 
face of market failures, they present a choice between flexibility and ri-
gidity in labor regulation. Thus, the question now is not whether regula-
tion is desirable, but rather what kind of regulation is needed.6 
The debate regarding what kind of labor market regulation leads to 
better economic outcomes has been particularly intense in Europe over 
the past fifteen years, as the region has experienced rising unemploy-
ment levels.7 This debate, however, is not limited to the European situa-
                                                          
5. For a paradigmatic example of this position, see WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT 
REPORT 1996: FROM PLAN TO MARKET 72–77 (1996). For positions against labor regulation, see 
MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE D. FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: A PERSONAL STATEMENT 228–47 
(1980); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992); Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Cri-
tique of the New Deal Labor Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357 (1983). In response to these critiques 
and in defense of important aspects of the New Deal-era regulatory efforts, see Julius G. Getman 
& Thomas C. Kohler, The Common Law, Labor Law, and Reality: A Response to Professor Eps-
tein, 92 YALE L.J. 1415 (1983); John J. Donohue III, Advocacy Versus Analysis in Assessing Em-
ployment Discrimination Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1583 (1991). For a detailed survey of the regula-
tory landscape in the United States, as well as several proposals for regulation reform, see PAUL 
C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 
(1990). For an analysis of the economic benefits of unions and collective bargaining regulation, 
see generally RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT DO UNIONS DO? (1984), and 
the reappraisal in Richard B. Freeman, What do Unions Do? The 2004 M-Brane Stringtwister 
Edition, in WHAT DO UNIONS DO?: A TWENTY-YEAR PERSPECTIVE 607 (James T. Bennett & 
Bruce E. Kaufman eds., 2007). 
6. See, e.g., Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Employment Security: A Comparative Institutional 
Debate, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1645, 1646 (1996) (summarizing arguments challenging the efficiency 
of employment at will and analyzing how different types of legal institutions can maximize em-
ployers’ and employees’ preferences); Simon Deakin & Frank Wilkinson, Labour Law and Eco-
nomic Theory: A Reappraisal, in LEGAL REGULATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION 29, 29–
31 (Hugh Collins, Paul Davies & Roger Rideout eds., 2000) (showing that labor regulation can 
have positive economic effects in the market); see also John J. Donohue III, Understanding the 
Reasons for and Impact of Legislatively Mandated Benefits for Selected Workers, 53 STAN. L. 
REV. 897, 897–98 (2001) (analyzing positive and negative economic effects of statutory labor 
rights); Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 
1611–12 (2002); Julius Getman, The National Labor Relations Act: What Went Wrong; Can We 
Fix It?, 45 B.C. L. REV. 125, 138–39 (2003). See generally KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM 
WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE (2004) (ex-
ploring a variety of legal institutions that can strengthen workers’ position in a flexible labor mar-
ket). 
7. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., OECD EMPLOYMENT OUTLOOK 4 (1993); 
ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., OECD EMPLOYMENT OUTLOOK 16 (1990); Dean Baker 
et al., Labor Market Institutions and Unemployment: Assessment of the Cross-Country Evidence, 
in FIGHTING UNEMPLOYMENT: THE LIMITS OF FREE MARKET ORTHODOXY 72, 74 (David Ho-
well ed., 2005); Olivier Blanchard & Justin Wolfers, The Role of Shocks and Institutions in the 
Rise of European Unemployment: The Aggregate Evidence, 110 ECON. J. 1, 1–4 (2000); Stephen 
Nickell, Unemployment and Labor Market Rigidities: Europe Versus North America, 11 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 55, 55–59 (1997); Horst Siebert, Labor Market Rigidities: At the Root of Unemployment 
in Europe, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 37, 37–39 (1997). See generally RICHARD LAYARD, STEPHEN 
NICKELL & RICHARD JACKMAN, UNEMPLOYMENT: MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND THE 
LABOUR MARKET (2005) (includes previous papers that became influential in the debates of the 
1990s); Jonas Agell, On the Benefits From Rigid Labour Markets: Norms, Market Failures, and 
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tion, and has important implications for the regulation of labor markets 
elsewhere. The protest of French youths against a law that would create 
a “flexible” labor contract for employees below age twenty-six attracted 
much media attention and brought to life the implications of the projects 
and the political weight they carry.8 We know that labor market institu-
tions create costs and incentives and affect behavior—that they matter. 
But how do they matter? What do we know about their impact on job 
creation, unemployment duration, productivity, investment in research 
and development, and, ultimately, on economic growth? Judging from 
the state of the debate, we know less than we might think. 
A. The Case for Flexibility of Labor Institutions 
The view that labor institutions create rigidities that favor workers 
who are ‘insiders’ to organized labor while disenfranchising the ‘outsid-
ers’ became a popular theoretical view in the 1970s.9 
More broadly, the neoclassical economics school argued that labor 
rigidities create market inefficiencies which should be eliminated 
through deregulation.10 At the policymaking level, the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) articulated one of the 
clearest positions in favor of flexible employment and labor legislation 
more than a decade ago, in its famous 1994 Job Study.11 This work at-
tributed Europe’s rising unemployment levels to “poorly functioning la-
bour markets,”12 characterized by burdensome regulations that made 
hiring and firing costly for employers, did not allow firms to adjust to 
economic cycles, and prevented further job creation.13 This view as-
sumes that restrictions on hiring and firing through employment protec-
tion legislation (EPL) create a labor market with higher entry and exit 
costs, dividing the market into “insiders” and “outsiders.” The problem 
with this legally-mandated structure, according to this view, is that the 
                                                                                                                                      
Social Insurance, 109 ECON. J. 143 (1999) (arguing in favor of labor market regulation in the face 
of European unemployment). 
8. See, e.g., Anthony Giddens, French Riots Show Need to Reform European Social Model, 
23 NEW PERSP. Q. 44, 44 (2006); Elaine Sciolino, Chirac Will Rescind Labor Law That Caused 
Wide French Riots, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2006, at A1. 
9. For a review of this theory, see Assar Lindbeck & Dennis J. Shower, Insiders Versus Out-
siders, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 1, 165–88 (2001). 
10. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 5. The leading exponent of labor deregula-
tion in legal scholarship is Richard A. Epstein. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, IN DEFENSE OF 
THE CONTRACT AT WILL 947 (1984). 
11. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., THE OECD JOBS STUDY: EVIDENCE AND 
EXPLANATIONS PART I, at viii (1994); ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., OECD JOBS 
STUDY: FACTS, ANALYSIS, STRATEGIES 43–49 (1994) [hereinafter OECD JOBS STUDY: FACTS, 
ANALYSIS, STRATEGIES]. 
12. OECD JOBS STUDY: FACTS, ANALYSIS, STRATEGIES, supra note 11, at 1. 
13. Id. at 4–6. 
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stability and security of the employment relationship comes at a high 
cost, namely the unwillingness of employers to hire.14 
B. Skeptics of Labor Flexibility15 
The labor flexibility position may have been widely accepted by in-
stitutional actors, but it was met with important theoretical objections. 
First, critics pointed out that the connection between labor flexibility 
and unemployment was at best tenuous and that labor flexibility was un-
likely to have any important effect on unemployment levels. Second, 
they cast serious doubt on the idea that government intervention in labor 
markets is generally and always inefficient. Indeed, labor regulation can 
enhance efficiency. Finally, they brought up broader normative objec-
tions to the deregulatory agenda beyond efficiency. 
As regards the first argument, labor flexibility proponents argued that 
EPL could negatively affect job creation even if it helps avoid sudden 
declines in employment.16 Critics of the pro-flexibility position, howev-
er, pointed out that the overall impact of EPL on employment levels 
would be minimal, since the decrease in short-term unemployment and 
the rise in long-term unemployment tend to offset each other.17 This 
leads to the conclusion that EPL would have more impact on the com-
position of the workforce rather than on the levels of unemployment.18 
Similarly, other scholars pointed to the experience of countries that have 
gone through the deregulatory agenda without results as to unemploy-
ment.19 
More importantly, various scholars have highlighted that EPL can 
enhance efficiency by reducing transaction costs and increasing produc-
tivity.20 According to this view, labor market transactions under at-will 
employment regimes are not perfectly competitive, as modeled by neoc-
lassical economists, but often entail structural problems such as high le-
                                                          
14. See id. at 46; Siebert, supra note 7, at 49. 
15. In this Section, I am using the term “flexibility” in the sense used by DB, although I ela-
borate upon the concept in Part IV. 
16. See DIAMOND ASHIAGBOR, THE EUROPEAN EMPLOYMENT STRATEGY: LABOUR 
MARKET REGULATION AND NEW GOVERNANCE 47 (2005); see also CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC 
POLICY RESEARCH, UNEMPLOYMENT: CHOICES FOR EUROPE 65 (1995). 
17. See ASHIAGBOR, supra note 16, at 47. See also Gøsta Esping-Andersen, Who is Harmed 
by Labour Market Regulations? Quantitative Evidence, in WHY DEREGULATE LABOR MARKETS? 
66, 85 (Gøsta Esping-Andersen & Marino Regini eds., 2000) (arguing that the deregulatory agen-
da is only tenuously anchored to economic theory and empirical research). 
18. See ASHIAGBOR, supra note 16, at 47; Esping-Andersen, supra note 17, at 67. 
19. See PAUL GREGG & ALAN MANNING, LABOUR MARKET REGULATION AND 
UNEMPLOYMENT 409–10 (1997). 
20. See Esping-Andersen, supra note 17, at 71. 
2009] LABOR FLEXIBILITY 51 
vels of uncertainty, asymmetrical information, and sunk costs.21 Under 
these conditions, arising conflicts create the need for constant renegotia-
tion of the “necessarily incomplete” employment contract, which is, in 
turn, inefficient.22 EPL in this case provides the governance structure 
that makes long term cooperation and trust between employers and em-
ployees possible.23 
The development of institutions such as internal labor markets and 
collective bargaining is not—as neoclassical economists would have 
it—an inefficient government intervention, but an efficient solution aris-
ing out of real needs that cannot be served by individual market transac-
tions. Without EPL, employees and employers will negotiate inefficient 
contracts which do not encourage the development of skills or the inter-
nal flexibility necessary for adaptation to changing external markets.24 
The point is to emphasize that even within the framework of economic 
efficiency, regulation cannot be dismissed out of hand and can often 
have positive economic effects for the targeted groups. 
Finally, scholars have made clear that economic efficiency is not the 
only normative criterion that should be considered when deciding the 
merits of regulation.25 There are, of course, important considerations of 
equity, justice, and fairness that are equally worthy of attention. These 
are values which may coincide with economic efficiency.26 But when 
these values conflict with efficiency goals, a society may legitimately 
wish to sacrifice greater wealth maximization.27 
                                                          
21. See ASHIAGBOR, supra note 16, at 48; see also Deakin & Wilkinson, supra note 6. 
22. See ASHIAGBOR, supra note 16, at 48; see also Christoph F. Buechtemann, Introduction: 
Employment Security and Labor Markets, in EMPLOYMENT SECURITY AND LABOR MARKET 
BEHAVIOR: INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACHES AND INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE 3, 12–13 (Chris-
toph F. Buechtemann ed., 1993). 
23. Deakin & Wilkinson, supra note 6. 
24. See generally ASHIAGBOR, supra note 16 (explaining that governance mechanisms such 
as an internal labor market, vertical integration, and collective bargaining can actually improve 
private law by compelling workers to internalize their work obligations and cooperate in ex-
change for job security and efficiency wages); PETER B. DOERINGER & MICHAEL J. PIORE, 
INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS AND MANPOWER ANALYSIS (1971). Moreover, it is argued that the 
stability in long-term relationships provided by EPL facilitates a higher degree of internal (func-
tional) flexibility and acceptance of technological changes. Durable relationships encourage firms 
to invest in human capital and training, leading to important increases in productivity and compe-
titiveness. ASHIAGBOR, supra note 16, at 48. 
25. See ASHIAGBOR, supra note 16, at 50–51. 
26. See Karl Klare, Countervailing Workers’ Power as a Regulatory Strategy, in LEGAL 
REGULATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION 63 (Hugh Colins, Paul Davies & Roger Rideout 
eds., 2000) (examining various goals of labor regulation and arguing that equity and efficiency 
considerations can sometimes coincide). 
27. See Simon Deakin & Frank Wilkinson, Rights vs Efficiency? The Economic Case for 
Transnational Labour Standards, 23 INDUSTRIAL L.J. 289 (1994). See generally Donohue, sup-
pra note 6. 
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C. The State of the Empirical Evidence 
Advocates of employment and labor deregulation rely on a variety of 
studies showing that countries with more flexible labor markets tend to 
fare better.28 These studies argue that certain features of labor market 
regulation, such as generous unemployment benefits, explain the in-
creasing asymmetry between European and U.S. employment rates.29 
Other studies, however, have cast doubt on the strength of the flex-
ibility claims.30 Economic studies sponsored by the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) have argued that rates of unemployment have in-
creased independently of the degree of market regulation.31 Moreover, 
they claim that whenever “flexibilization” of labor regulation has been 
implemented, it has not yielded the promised results.32 In many coun-
tries, the power of unions effectively decreased, unemployment benefits 
were reduced, and minimum wages were, in some cases, curtailed with 
scant, if any, positive employment effects.33 Labor economist Richard 
B. Freeman argues that critics of the orthodoxy have successfully dem-
onstrated that the data are more ambiguous than what promoters of this 
orthodox view claim.34 
As Freeman notes, these challenges have impelled “even the OECD 
to retreat from its strong Jobs Study claim to a more equivocal position 
                                                          
28. See Nickell, supra note 7, at 55–59; Stephen Nickell, Luca Nunziata & Wolfand Ochel, 
Unemployment in the OECD Since the 1960s: What Do We Know?, 115 ECON. J. 1, 10–11 
(2005). 
29. Id. at 72. 
30. See Baker et al., supra note 7. Richard Freeman gives this article credit for documenting 
that “the findings in several time series models, that find that institutions adversely affect aggre-
gate outcomes, are not robust. The estimated coefficients on labor institutions disappear or be-
come statistically insignificant when the researchers made modest changes in measures of institu-
tions, countries covered, and time periods of analysis. Models that covered more years, countries, 
and measures than earlier studies ‘provide little support for those who advocate comprehensive 
deregulation of OECD labor markets.’” Freeman, supra note 4, at 135 (footnote omitted).  
31. The Jobs Letter, The 1996–97 ILO Jobs Report: There’s Plenty of Work to Do!!, (Letter 
No. 52, Dec. 20, 1996), http://www.jobsletter.org.nz/jbl05210.htm [hereinafter The 1996–97 ILO 
Jobs Report] (summarizing the ILO’s report on world employment for 1996–97). 
32. Id. Consistent with the ILO findings, an empirical study compared the impact of hiring, 
firing, and unemployment regulations on employment levels, actors’ behavior, and productivity in 
seven Latin American countries. The study found no identifiable effect on economic perfor-
mance, specifically as regards productivity. See Adriana Marshall, Consecuencias económicas de 
los regímenes de protección del trabajo. Un estudio comparativo, in LAS INSTITUCIONES 
LABORALES FRENTE A LOS CAMBIOS EN AMÉRICA LATINA 391, 415–16 (José B. Figueiredo ed., 
1996). Another example comes from Card and Krueger’s famous study of the employment effects 
of minimum wage increases. Comparing New Jersey fast food restaurants where an increase of 
minimum wages occurred with Philadelphia where it did not, the authors concluded that the in-
crease did not negatively affect employment. See DAVID CARD & ALAN B. KRUEGER, MYTH 
AND MEASUREMENT: THE NEW ECONOMICS OF THE MINIMUM WAGE 25–69 (1995). 
33. The 1996–97 ILO Jobs Report, supra note 31. 
34. See Freeman, supra note 4, at 136; Freeman, supra note 5, at 614–16. 
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about the impact of institutions on outcomes.”35 The 2004 OECD Em-
ployment Outlook admitted that the “evidence of the role played by 
EPL on aggregate employment . . . rates remain[ed] mixed . . . .”36 
Thus, these studies have demonstrated that the evidence is far from con-
clusive and that, at the very least, the burden of proof now lies with the 
proponents of comprehensive labor deregulation. This mixed and incon-
clusive evidence would seem to warrant some caution towards legal 
reform projects that push for the removal of protections in the employ-
ment contract as a panacea for better economic performance. Still, the 
Doing Business project seems to push precisely for such removal of 
protections.37 
In the face of theoretical disagreements and mixed empirical evi-
dence, scholars have turned to measuring law as a way to assess its im-
pact on social and economic outcomes. Scholars are trying to evaluate 
how law matters and, more specifically, what kind of legal institutions 
are best for economic performance.38 This inquiry has caused scholars 
and international development institutions to produce a wealth of legal 
indicators, attempting to deliver an answer.39 
Among these attempts, the leading indicators have been built by 
DB.40 This project examines legal regimes around the world and pro-
poses legal “best practices” in a variety of different domains. In the area 
of labor market regulation, DB has promoted labor law “flexibility” as a 
necessary part of the recipe for economic development.41 Based on a set 
of indicators that correlate labor “flexibility” with better economic per-
                                                          
35. Freeman, supra note 4, at 136. 
36. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV. OECD EMPLOYMENT OUTLOOK 81 (2004). 
37. The overall thrust of DB in the field of labor and employment is to recommend that coun-
tries dismantle labor protections. See WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS IN 2006: CREATING JOBS 
26 (2005) [hereinafter DOING BUSINESS 2006]. For an example of DB encouraging “flexibiliza-
tion” that leads to less labor protection, see WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS 2007: HOW TO 
REFORM 19–20 (2007) [hereinafter DOING BUSINESS 2007] (lauding Macedonia for flexibilization 
of “overtime” regulation and simplification of redundancy procedures). 
38. See generally Kevin E. Davis, What Can the Rule of Law Variable Tell Us About Rule of 
Law Reforms, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 141 (2004) (critically reviewing a variety of legal indicators). 
39. See, e.g., Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113, 1152 (1998); 
Daniel Kaufmann, Rethinking Governance: Empirical Lessons Challenge Orthodoxy (March 11, 
2003) (Discussion Draft, World Bank), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ 
INTWBIGOVANTCOR/Resources/rethink_gov_stanford.pdf; Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay & 
Pablo Zoido-Lobatón, Governance Matters (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 
2196, 1999); see also Daniel Kaufmann et al., Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators 
for 1996–2004 (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 3630, 2005). 
40. For more general information, see the World Bank’s Doing Business Project, 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2009). 
41. See DOING BUSINESS 2006 supra note 37; WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS IN 2005: 
REMOVING OBSTACLES TO GROWTH 30–32 (2005) [hereinafter DOING BUSINESS 2005]; WORLD 
BANK, DOING BUSINESS IN 2004: UNDERSTANDING REGULATION 30–38 (2004) [hereinafter 
DOING BUSINESS 2004]. 
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formance, the DB reports advise countries around the world to strip 
down their labor regulations into flexible ones.42 
These indicators have been both praised43 and criticized44 by the po-
licymaking and academic communities, but praise and critique alike 
have largely taken for granted these indicators’ characterization of labor 
regulation as a binary choice between flexible and rigid rules. Advo-
cates hail the report as the best available demonstration of the economic 
virtues of flexibility, while critics show the social and economic bene-
fits of labor protections.45 This Article contributes to the law and devel-
opment debate by offering a critique of these prominent labor flexibility 
                                                          
42. DB ranks countries’ performance based on a rigidity/flexibility score and encourages la-
bor market reforms. Each year, DB includes accounts of both successful country reforms towards 
more labor flexibility and also counterproductive rigid reforms. See, e.g., WORLD BANK, DOING 
BUSINESS 2009, 19–23 [hereinafter DOING BUSINESS 2009]. 
43. See Josette Sheeran, Under Sec’y for Econ., Bus. & Agric. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, 
Remarks at the U.S. Department of State: Doing Business in the World 2007: A New Emphasis 
for the U.S. Government (Sept. 8, 2006), http://2001-2009.state.gov/e/rm/2006/72879.htm 
(“[T]his report with its detailed, objective indicators gives us a unique comparative view of mi-
croeconomics—looking at 10 areas of everyday business, from registering property to getting 
credit and enforcing contracts. . . . I actually keep the Doing Business report by my bedside. This 
report tells me more about a nation’s economy and its potential, than anything else I’ve ever seen 
written.”). 
44. In this Article, I join efforts with the critics of the Doing Business project. See, e.g., Beni-
to Arruñada, Pitfalls to Avoid When Measuring the Institutions: Is Doing Business Damaging 
Business? 35 J. COMP. ECON. 729, 735–44 (2007); Kevin E. Davis & Michael B. Kruse, Taking 
the Measure of Law: The Case of the Doing Business Project, 32 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1095, 1104–
16 (2007). Janine Berg & Sandrine Cazes, Int’l Labour Org., The Doing Business Indicators: 
Measurement Issues and Political Implications, at 5, Economic & Labour Market Paper 2007/6 
(2007), available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/protection/condtrav/pdf/rdwbpaper07.pdf. I 
also join scholars who have criticized the “legal origins” literature that underpins the Doing Busi-
ness project. In particular, see Detlev Vagts, Comparative Company Law – The New Wave, in 
FESTSCHRIFT FÜR JEAN NICOLAS DRUEY ZUM 65. GEBURTSTAG 595, 597–605 (Rainer J. 
Schweizer, Herbert Burkert & Urs Gasser eds., 2002); Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & 
Jean-Francois Richard, Economic Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect, 47 EUR. 
ECON. REV. 165, 192 (2003); John K.M. Ohnesorge, China’s Economic Transition and the New 
Legal Origins Literature, CHINA ECON. REV. 485, 487–90 (2003); Mark J. Roe, Legal Origins, 
Politics, and Modern Stock Markets, 120 HARV. L. REV. 460, 465 (2006); KENNETH W. DAM, 
THE LAW-GROWTH NEXUS: THE RULE OF LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (2006). In addi-
tion, a few papers have responded to the argument that legal origin determines divergence in la-
bor regulation. See Beth Ahlering & Simon Deakin, Labor Regulation, Corporate Governance 
and Legal Origin: A Case of Institutional Complementarity? 14–32 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., 
Working Paper No. 72/2006, 2005) (challenging the alleged connection between the type of legal 
tradition and labor regulation using historical and contemporary examples); David E. Pozen, The 
Regulation of Labor and the Relevance of Legal Origin, 28 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 43, 45–55 
(2006) (challenging the legal origins coding methodology). My Article joins efforts with these 
responses but attempts to go beyond correcting this methodology. It lays the groundwork for a 
different analytical framework to enable a more contextual description of labor regimes, their re-
lation to economic life, and the potential effects of prescribed reforms. 
45. Compare Sheeran, supra note 43, with Berg & Cazes, supra note 44, at 5–7. 
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indicators and proposing a new analytical framework that can be a shar-
per tool for legal and policy analysis. 
In this Article, I develop insights gained from comparative law and 
legal theory to challenge the World Bank project’s theoretical assump-
tions, pointing out its methodological flaws and showing its potentially 
misleading recommendations for legal reform. The endeavor has global 
significance, since these indicators seem to gain credibility by claiming 
to objectively describe regulatory frameworks around the world. 
II. THE WORLD BANK’S DOING BUSINESS PROJECT 
A. Background 
Doing Business is now the World Bank’s most widely circulating re-
port, and has received ample publicity in international policymaking 
circles and developing countries.46 Even though the report is not legally 
binding upon borrowing countries, it exerts increasing sway on the 
World Bank’s own diagnosis of the problems in countries’ regulation 
and on the Bank’s prescriptions in a variety of regulatory fields.47 
                                                          
46. See, e.g., PETER BAKVIS, INT’L CONFEDERATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS, HOW THE 
WORLD BANK & IMF USE THE DOING BUSINESS REPORT TO PROMOTE LABOUR MARKET 
DEREGULATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 2, 5, 7–12 (2006), available at 
http://archivio.rassegna.it/2006/europamondo/articoli/doingbusinessicftuanalysis0606.pdf. 
47. I do not mean to suggest that all groups in the World Bank unequivocally accept this me-
thodology or that there are not other methodologies at work in the institution. Indeed, there are 
groups in the Bank that have analyzed labor regulation in a quite different way. See e.g., TOKE 
AIDT & ZAFIRIS TZANNATOS, WORLD BANK, UNIONS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: 
ECONOMIC EFFECTS IN A GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT (2002). This report found that “at the macroe-
conomic level, high unionization rates lead to lower inequality of earnings and improve economic 
performance (in the form of lower unemployment and inflation, higher productivity and speedier 
adjustment to shocks).” Press Release, World Bank, Economies Perform Better in Coordinated 
Labor Markets, Press Release No. 2003/211/S (Feb. 12, 2003), available at 
http://go.worldbank.org/DCFCSPJL20. In contrast to DB, this report neither identifies nor re-
commends best regulatory practices. Instead, it calls attention to countries’ context and institu-
tional setting. The report emphasized that “[w]hile the available evidence from comparative stu-
dies of the OECD countries is fragile, two general features should be emphasized. First, the 
impact of collective bargaining on various aspects of macroeconomic performance depends on 
the economic, legal, and political environment in which collective bargaining takes place and can 
vary over time. Second, important complementarities exist between key aspects of the bargaining 
system. . . . It is the package of institutions that matters.” AIDT & TZANNATOS, supra, at 5. The 
Doing Business project, however, seems to be the most influential, and its indicators are having 
great impact on recommendations for legal reform. For an institutional analysis of the World 
Bank describing the variety of theoretical frameworks within which different groups operate in 
promoting regulatory reform, see Alvaro Santos, The World Bank’s Uses of the “Rule of Law” 
Promise in Economic Development, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A 
CRITICAL APPRAISAL 253 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006). 
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The DB project is the translation into policy of a theoretical claim 
generated by what has become known as the “legal origins” literature,48 
whose influence in the field of economics lends DB credibility. The le-
gal origins scholarship, first advanced in the field of comparative corpo-
rate finance, has emerged as an increasingly dominant analytical 
framework for law reform aimed at stimulating economic develop-
ment.49 The authors of this scholarship argue that legal tradition ex-
plains differences in countries’ approaches to regulation.50 Adopting the 
conventional categorization of legal systems into “legal families,” these 
authors assert that regulation in common law countries is more efficient 
and leads to better social and economic outcomes than in civil law coun-
tries.51 Consequently, the authors of DB, some of whom participate in 
the legal origins scholarship, recommend that countries adopt the em-
ployment laws of countries whose legal systems originated in common 
law, by which they mean an at-will employment regime.52 According to 
DB, since the type of labor regulation that exists in a country is the re-
sult of historical accident rather than political choices, countries can and 
should transform their legal regimes by adopting whatever best-practice 
rules would work better for any given regulatory area, even if this adop-
tion is piecemeal. 
The DB authors are not alone in coding countries’ regulatory systems 
and correlating them with economic performance in an attempt to ex-
plain the relationship between labor and employment regulation and 
economic growth. There are a number of important indicators that seek 
to provide countries with guidance on how to regulate their labor mar-
kets to promote development.53 Indeed, the results of these various indi-
                                                          
48. See, e.g., Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, Legal Origins, 117 Q.J. ECON. 1193, 
1223–24 (2002). 
49. See La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note 39, at 1114–17 (1998). These theorists 
have produced a vast “legal origins” literature, rapidly expanding from the field of corporate 
finance to other areas of regulation like administrative law, bankruptcy, labor and employment, 
and civil procedure. See Simeon Djankov et al., Courts, 118 Q.J. ECON. 453, 453–59 (2003); 
Simeon Djankov et al., Debt Enforcement Around the World, 116 J. POL. ECON. 1105, 1146–48 
(2008); Simeon Djankov et al., The Regulation of Entry, 117 Q.J. ECON. 1, 1–5 (2002); Rafael La 
Porta et al., The Quality of Government, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 222, 224, 231–33, 261–62 (1999); 
Aron Balas et. al., The Divergence of Legal Procedures 2–5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 13809, 2008), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w13809. 
50. See La Porta et al., The Quality of Government, supra note 49, at 222, for an argument 
that the common law legal tradition goes with less interventionist regulatory attitudes. 
51. See Glaeser & Shleifer, supra note 48. 
52. See Juan C. Botero et al., The Regulation of Labor, 119 Q.J. ECON. 1339, 1375–80 
(2004). 
53. See, e.g., JAMES J. HECKMAN & CARMEN PAGÉS, LAW AND EMPLOYMENT: LESSONS 
FROM LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 39–65 (2004); Alvaro Forteza & Martín Rama, La-
bor Market “Rigidity” and the Success of Economic Reform Across More than One Hundred 
Countries 21–31 (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 2521, 2002); James Heck-
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cators are often inconsistent.54 I focus on DB because it is the leading 
project in the field and it enjoys the support of the principal internation-
al development institution in the world, making it highly influential. 
In 2004, at a time when the strongest claims supporting labor flexibil-
ity had been challenged and the empirical evidence in countries’ expe-
rience remained mixed, DB began to make a forceful intervention to 
push the scales in favor of labor flexibility.55 DB is an ambitious enter-
prise. So far, it has released six annual reports that include quantitative 
indicators on about a dozen topics regarding the legal business envi-
ronment, ranking now 181 countries. After beginning with the funda-
mental aspects of the firm’s life cycle—starting a business,56 hiring and 
firing workers,57 enforcing contracts,58 getting credit,59 and closing a 
business60—DB has since expanded to the areas of registering proper-
ty,61 issuing government licenses and conducting inspections, protecting 
investors,62 paying taxes,63 and trading across borders.64 In employment 
law, the DB indicators consider countries’ employment regulation and 
correlate the scores with economic performance. The underlying idea is 
that such correlation will allow scholars and policymakers to draw con-
clusions about the relationship between labor regulation and economic 
performance. To corroborate results, the study relies on the support of a 
network of local law firms and business consultants around the globe.65 
According to DB’s own website, the purpose of the whole endeavor 
is legal reform based on objective data that can produce replicable for-
mulas: 
The analysis in Doing Business has direct relevance for policy 
reform. It reveals the relationship between business regulation 
indicators and economic and social outcomes, allowing policy-
makers to see how particular laws and regulations are associated 
                                                                                                                                      
man & Carmen Pagés, The Cost of Job Security Regulation: Evidence from Latin American Labor 
Markets 28–30 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7773, 2000), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7773. 
54. See Gordon Betcherman, Amy Luinstra & Makoto Ogawa, Labor Market Regulation: In-
ternational Experience in Promoting Employment and Social Protection 1–4 (World Bank, Social 
Protection Discussion Paper Series No. 128, 2001). 
55. See, e.g., BAKVIS, supra note 46, at 6–13. 
56. DOING BUSINESS 2004, supra note 41, at 17–28. 
57. Id. at 29–39. 
58. Id. at 41–54. 
59. Id. at 55–70. 
60. Id. at 71–82. 
61. DOING BUSINESS 2005, supra note 41, at 33–40. 
62. Id. at 49–58. 
63. DOING BUSINESS 2006, supra note 41, at 45–52. 
64. Id. at 53–60. 
65. See id. at 77; DOING BUSINESS 2009, supra note 42, at 62. 
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with poverty, corruption, employment, access to credit, the size 
of the informal economy, and the entry of new firms. Also, the 
analysis provides guidance on the design of reforms. . . . Gov-
ernments can identify, after reviewing their country's Doing 
Business indicators, where they lag behind and what to reform.66 
Elsewhere, DB has identified four project goals, three of which relate 
to legal reform: (1) “motivating reforms through country benchmark-
ing,” (2) “informing the design of reforms,” (3) “enriching international 
initiatives on development effectiveness,” and (4) “informing theory.”67 
Regarding labor market regulation, DB promotes five reform efforts: 
(1) reduce the scope of employment regulation; (2) introduce flexible 
part-time and fixed-term contracts; (3) reduce or lower the minimum 
wage for new entrants; (4) allow employers to shift work time between 
periods of slow demand and peak periods, without the need for overtime 
payment; and (5) ease regulations on firing by cutting severance pay-
ments, easing or eliminating notice, and increasing the number of ‘fair 
causes’ for dismissal.68 These reforms, in turn, will “ease the burden on 
businesses and provide better job opportunities for the poor.”69 
The DB project authors have maintained from early on that they sup-
port basic ILO conventions on labor rights, prohibiting discriminatory 
practices, enabling freedom of association and collective bargaining, 
and prohibiting forced and child labor.70 As it becomes obvious howev-
er, from the indicators themselves as well as from the accompanying 
explanatory text of the DB reports, the DB authors distinguish between 
‘flexible’ and ‘rigid’ labor regulation, claiming that the former is prefer-
able to the latter because flexible regulation leads to better economic 
performance: 
[I]f regulation in other aspects of the employment relation is too 
rigid, it lowers labor force participation, increases unemploy-
ment, and forces workers into the informal economy. . . . [I]f the 
average Latin American country were to reduce its employment 
protection to the level found in the United States, estimated total 
employment would rise by almost six percentage points. In some 
countries, the negative effects of rigid employment regulation are 
even larger. A 10 percent increase in dismissal costs in Peru is 
                                                          
66. Ask a Question – Doing Business – The World Bank Group, 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/AskQuestion (last visited Sept. 19, 2009) (click on “Can Doing 
Business help design reforms?” hyperlink). 
67. DOING BUSINESS 2004, supra note 41, at ix–x. 
68. Id. at xix–xx. 
69. Id. at xix. 
70. See id. at 29. 
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associated with an estimated increase in long-term unemploy-
ment of 11 percent, and in India and Zimbabwe of about 20 per-
cent.71 
At times, DB has more directly blamed unemployment on “rigid em-
ployment regulation.” In the 2005 Doing Business report, the World 
Bank authors sympathetically follow “Yasmine,” a young, educated fe-
male worker in Burkina Faso who cannot find a job and is relegated to 
the informal sector. They then go on to assert that “Yasmine’s plight 
can be explained by rigid employment regulation.”72 The obvious solu-
tion for governments is then to reform in the flexible direction. 
To illustrate the frenzy of reform that the DB indicators seem to have 
provoked in developing countries, as well as the logic of regulatory 
competition these indicators feed into, consider the following quote 
from the 2007 DB report, “How to Reform”: 
Publishing comparative data on the ease of doing business in-
spires governments to reform. Since its start in October 2003, the 
Doing Business project has inspired or informed 48 reforms 
around the world. Mozambique is reforming several aspects of 
its business environment, with the goal of reaching the top rank 
on the ease of doing business in southern Africa. Burkina Faso, 
Mali and Niger are competing for the top rank in West Africa. 
Georgia has targeted the top 25 list and uses Doing Business in-
dicators as benchmarks of its progress. Mauritius and Saudi Ara-
bia have targeted the top 10. 
 Comparisons among states or cities within a country are even 
stronger drivers of reform. Recent studies across 13 cities in Bra-
zil and 12 in Mexico have created fierce competition to build the 
best business environment. . . . 
 To be useful for reformers, indicators need to be simple, easy 
to replicate and linked to specific policy changes. Only then will 
they motivate reform and be useful in evaluating its success.73 
DB recommends that countries start with reforms that involve admin-
istrative, not legislative, changes, although its highest laurels go to 
countries that do attempt the whole package: 
The 3 boldest reforms, driving the biggest improvements in the 
Doing Business indicators: 
• Mexico’s increase in investor protections, in its new secur-
ities law. 
                                                          
71. Id. 
72. DOING BUSINESS 2006, supra note 37, at 21. 
73. DOING BUSINESS 2007, supra note 37, at 3–4. 
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• Georgia’s flexible labor rules, in its new labor code. 
• Serbia’s easing of exporting and importing procedures, in 
its new customs code.74 
In addition, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) 
has strongly supported the DB indicators.75 A USAID official asserted 
that “countries that are willing to embark on serious reforms in these 
areas will find ready and willing support from the donors,” and that 
“[t]hose countries and leaders willing to undertake significant reform 
and governance improvement will be recognized and will receive sub-
stantial and appropriate support.”76 Thus, besides the World Bank’s own 
support for reforms undertaken to improve a country’s DB indicators, 
the project enjoys full support from one of the biggest development as-
sistance donors in the world.77 
DB’s recommendations largely boil down to a simple legal reform 
proposal: turn civil law labor regulation into common law rules. DB has 
boldly declared that, in the case of business regulation, “One Size Can 
Fit All.”78 In the case of employment and labor regulation, that means a 
blanket endorsement of what DB calls a “flexible” regime.79 But how 
does DB measure flexibility in legal regimes? 
                                                          
74. Id. at 3. 
75. USAID has sponsored several events publicizing the DB reports. See, e.g., Regional 
World Bank’s Doing Business Report Identifies Necessary Reforms for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
and Uzbekistan, http://www.usaid.gov/locations/europe_eurasia/press/success/2006-06-15.html 
(last visited Sept. 19, 2009) (noting that USAID sponsored events that introduced the “Doing 
Business in 2006: Creating Jobs” report in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan to “representatives of 
government, private sector, academia, donors, and media . . . .”); USAID, World Bank, IFC Mark 
the Release of the 2008 Doing Business Report, Oct. 17 2007, (http://www.prnewswire.com/ 
cgi-bin/stories.pl?ACCT=104&STORY=/www/story/10-19-2007/0004686038). USAID frequent-
ly refers to DB indicators to highlight the success of its foreign aid to countries that  
have moved up in the DB rankings. See e.g., USAID, Afghanistan Land Titling and  
Economic Restructuring Activity, World Bank 2008 Doing Business Report, 
http://www.ltera.org/index.php?option=com_content&id=99-world-bank-2008-doing-business-
report/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2009) (noting that the 2008 DB report recognized “Afghanistan's 
great progress with the simplification of the registration process for immovable property with 
USAID/LTERA's support”). USAID is not the only U.S. government agency that supports the DB 
indicators. The State Department has also voiced strong support for DB. See Sheeran, supra note 
43 (noting that “the U.S. government sees [the DB report] as an important economic diplomacy 
tool”). 
76. Andrew S. Natsios, Adm’r, U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., Keynote Speech to the Corporate 
Council on Africa (Sept. 14, 2005), http://www2.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/EGUA-
6GLNRB/. 
77. The United States is one of the most important development assistance donors in absolute 
dollar numbers, although it pales in comparison with other major donor governments when the 
assistance provided is taken as a percentage of the national domestic product. See CURT TARNOFF 
& LARRY NOWELS, FOREIGN AID: AN INTRODUCTORY OVERVIEW OF US POLICY AND 
PROGRAMS (Cong. Research Serv., CRS Report for Congress Order Code 98-916, Apr. 14, 2004). 
78. DOING BUSINESS 2004, supra note 41, at xvi. 
79. Each DB report includes a section on hiring/firing, now called “employing workers,” in 
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B. Methodology 
DB identifies three categories in the legal regulation of employment: 
hiring, working conditions, and firing. It then formulates under each 
category a series of questions aimed at clarifying the legal regimes of 
the countries studied. Each category is the basis for an index.80 Hiring, 
for instance, is divided into part-time contracts and fixed-time contracts. 
The task is to measure how flexible or rigid a country’s employment 
law is by looking at how much its rules depart from parties’ total free-
dom of contract. Based on its “yes” or “no” answers to the questions for 
each category, the country receives a score of zero or 100, signifying 
flexibility or rigidity respectively, for each question. The averages of 
these scores yield the flexibility indicator for each aspect—hiring, work-
ing conditions, or firing. An overall average represents the country’s 
employment law flexibility index. Averages closer to 100 indicate more 
rigidity, and averages closer to zero indicate more flexibility.81 
                                                                                                                                      
which the authors assess how far countries have gone toward implementing flexible labor regula-
tion. See DOING BUSINESS 2009, supra note 42, at 19–23. The 2009 report claims that a 20% de-
crease in industrial output in the Indian state of West Bengal could be attributed to a reform of 
labor regulations in the rigid direction, further blaming these reforms for an estimated additional 
1.8 million urban poor. Id. at 20. 
80. See infra Table 1 for the components of each index. 
81. For an explanation of the most current methodology, see Doing Business, 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/MethodologySurveys/EmployingWorkers.aspx (last visited Sept. 
19, 2009). 
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TABLE 1: RIGIDITIES IN EMPLOYMENT REGULATION82 
Here is an example of how the methodology works, as explained by 
the report: 
If the regulation restricts the ability of managers and workers to 
negotiate the employment contract, a value of 100 is entered, ze-
ro otherwise. For example, fixed-term contracts are allowed in 
Venezuela only for temporary tasks, while in Vietnam they are 
allowed for any task. On this component of the hiring index, Ve-
nezuela gets a 100, Vietnam a 0. Similarly, managers have to 
give fair cause for dismissal in Cameroon, but not in Jamaica. On 
this component of the flexibility-of-firing index, Cameroon gets 
a 100, Jamaica a 0. The scores are averaged across the compo-
nents of each index, to get the value of the index itself.83 
The results are reflected in Table 3.2, which shows how countries 
scored in each of these three indices.84 The upper part of the table shows 
the most flexible countries and the lower part the least flexible ones. 
These are some of the results: 
• Employment regulation is more flexible in developed 
                                                          
82. DOING BUSINESS 2004, supra note 41, at 35. 
83. Id. at 34. 
84. Id. at 36. 
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countries. 
• The countries with the most rigid employment regulation 
include six Latin American countries (Brazil, Mexico, Pa-
nama, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela), and Angola, Bela-
rus, Mozambique, and Portugal. 
• Some countries have very strong protection in one of the 
indices but not in the others. . . . In general, however, the 
indicators of labor regulation tend to move together: re-
strictions on hiring go with restrictions on firing as well as 
with more rigid conditions on employment. 
• Rich countries have the lowest average scores in all indic-
es. Nordic-origin countries regulate employment relations 
the least in conditions of employment but less so in dis-
missals, in which English-origin countries have the lightest 
regulation. 
• Across regions East Asian economies regulate the least 
and Latin American countries, the most . . . .85 
 
TABLE 2: INDEXES ON EMPLOYMENT REGULATION86 
 
Based on these results, the authors promote an agenda for flexibility 
in labor regulation that means ridding the system of many restrictions 
and compulsory clauses in the employment contracts.87 
                                                          
85. Id. at 34–35 (internal citations omitted). 
86. DOING BUSINESS 2004, supra note 40, at 36. 
87. This is evident even in the way in which DB ranks countries’ labor regulations. For in-
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Since 2004, DB has effectuated several changes to its methodology, 
initially in the direction of more accurately trying to capture what it 
considers a “rigidity,” and later on responding to critiques coming from 
the ILO in the opposite direction. In 2005 and 2006, DB added a cost of 
firing index and a cost of hiring index, respectively. The cost of hiring 
index measured all social security payments and payroll taxes asso-
ciated with hiring an employee.88 The cost was expressed as a percen-
tage of the worker’s salary. The cost of firing index measured ‘rigidity’ 
in terms of weeks of wages that were due to a fired worker. Thus, in 
2006, the overall employing workers’ index was comprised of the em-
ployment regulation index (hiring, conditions of employment, and fir-
ing) and the hiring and firing cost indicators. In 2007, DB removed the 
hiring cost indicator (now renamed nonwage labor costs) and included it 
instead in the “paying taxes” indicator. 
In 2007, two researchers of the ILO published an article that criti-
cized the Doing Business report for discouraging countries from abiding 
with the ILO convention obligations they have undertaken: 
The employing workers’ index clearly does not encourage coun-
tries to abide by many of the International Labour Conventions 
of the International Labour Organization (ILO). In many in-
stances, countries score worse if their national labour legislation 
reflects the provisions set forth in the ILO Conventions concern-
ing termination of employment, minimum wages, working hours 
and annual leave, even though these are international treaties rati-
fied and adopted by many countries. Moreover, countries that ab-
ide by the conventions on Fundamental Principles and Rights of 
Work do not score better than countries that have not adopted 
these conventions.89 
In response, the 2008 DB report effectuated two main changes, which 
it asserted would assure that “it is possible for an economy to receive 
the highest score on the ease of employing workers—indicating the 
most flexible labor regulations—and comply with all 187 ILO conven-
tions.”90 First, employment provisions providing for up to eight weeks 
of worker compensation are given a score of zero in the ease of employ-
ing workers index, and restrictions on night work, such as higher over-
                                                                                                                                      
stance, the more a country’s regulatory framework provides for worker compensation upon dis-
missal, the worse it fares in the cost-of-firing index. See DOING BUSINESS 2009, supra note 42, at 
67. 
88. For a critique of the idea that cutting payroll taxes helps lower the unemployment rate, see 
BRIAN BELL & STEPHEN NICKELL, CUTTING PAYROLL TAXES ON THE UNSKILLED 320–22 
(1997). 
89. See Berg & Cazes, supra note 44, at 3. 
90. WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS 2008, at 68 (2008). 
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time premiums or limitations on scheduling work hours, are no longer 
coded as rigidities.91 Second, DB no longer gives a score of 100 (the 
worst score) to countries whose employers need to either notify or get 
approval for laying off a group of more than 20 workers. The cutoff 
point has now been increased to 25.92 
In 2008, the Independent Evaluation Group of the World Bank as-
serted that even though the DB methodology conforms to the letter of 
the ILO conventions, it did not assure conformity with the spirit of the 
conventions because it penalized countries that offered greater job pro-
tection than that stipulated by the conventions.93 
III. CRITIQUES OF THE DOING BUSINESS METHODOLOGY 
DB makes very strong claims about the potential effects of labor law 
reform on economic development, and these claims increasingly influ-
ence international policymaking. Some of the most active groups in the 
World Bank very strongly support the DB indicators as a tool for regu-
latory reform. Unlike past lending projects in the 1990s, in which the 
World Bank would tie its loans to reform conditions, the DB indicators 
are not part of the loan conditionalities.94 Nonetheless, the World Bank 
promotes the project through press releases, a highly visible website on 
the World Bank portal, where “top reformers” are lauded, and promi-
nent placement of the DB reports on the World Bank’s “Rapid Re-
sponse Unit,” a website that has described its aims as seeking to “offer[] 
best practice public policy advice for private sector led growth . . . in 
developing countries” and help seekers “[f]ind expert analysis, powerful 
databases, quick solutions, and comprehensive ‘how-to’ guides.”95 
Furthermore, the DB has created a “Reformers Club” to celebrate the 
top reformers in its rankings. Each year, DB invites government offi-
cials from the top reformers to an awards ceremony to honor their 
achievements and further stimulate reform based on the DB reports.96  
                                                          
91. Id. 
92. Id. at 72. 
93. INDEPENDENT EVALUATION GROUP, WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS: AN INDEPENDENT 
EVALUATION: TAKING THE MEASURE OF THE WORLD BANK-IFC DOING BUSINESS INDICATORS, 
at xvi (2008), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTDOIBUS/Resources/ 
db_evaluation.pdf. 
94. For a discussion of the earlier World Bank and IMF loan conditionality practices, see Jeff-
rey Sachs, Conditionality, Debt Relief, and the Developing Country Debt Crisis (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 2644, 1988), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=261258. 
95. Private Sector Development Home – Private Sector Development – The World Bank 
Group, http://web.archive.org/web/20070609131513/http://rru.worldbank.org/ (last visited Sept. 
19, 2009). 
96. See Reformers Club – Doing Business – The World Bank Group, 
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Finally, the World Bank’s Country Economic Memoranda (CEM), 
which form the basis for its policy recommendations, regularly cite the 
DB indicators.97 In addition, the U.S. government, one of the most im-
portant development assistance donors in the world, seems to have 
adopted the DB indicators as part of its development assistance hand-
book.98 
Therefore, we should seriously consider both DB’s descriptions of 
labor law regimes around the world and the policy proposals they derive 
from these descriptions. In this Part, I develop critiques of the DB 
project, drawing insights from comparative law and legal theory. My 
argument is that a series of very serious omissions that seem to come 
from a flawed understanding of regulation mars the way in which DB 
sets out to compare labor law “flexibility.” If DB’s flexibility-rigidity 
index took into account several lessons from legal scholarship, it would 
likely look very different. Part III.A, below, describes the omissions and 
misunderstandings built into the DB project’s methodology. Part III.B 
illustrates how a specific labor law regime may be dramatically misre-
presented in DB’s index because of these methodological flaws. 
A. Three Lessons from Comparative Law 
Any study seeking to determine whether a given type of regulation is 
flexible or rigid across countries must consider basic lessons of compar-
ative methodology. Comparative lawyers generally accept the premise 
that a meaningful comparison between two legal rules must pay atten-
tion to the function that the rule performs.99 Norms with the same name 
can have different functions. Similarly, legal institutions that at first 
seem unrelated can play the same role in their respective contexts. 
These lessons concerning the functional equivalence of legal norms are 
missing in the DB methodology. Further, any comparative study ought 
to consider the following three factors. 
1. Attention to the Full Range of Legal Sources 
The normative order in operation stems from a variety of legal 
sources, not only the law as it exists on the books. The employment 
                                                                                                                                      
http://www.doingbusiness.org/Reformers/ReformersClub.aspx (last visited Sept. 19, 2009). 
97. See BAKVIS, supra note 46, at 7–12. 
98. See Sheeran, supra note 43. 
99. This idea, which is hardly controversial, was heralded by Rudolf Schlesinger and has 
come to be known as the Cornell comparative law approach. See RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER ET 
AL., COMPARATIVE LAW: CASES, TEXT, MATERIALS 2–3 (6th ed. 1998). See generally O. Kahn-
Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1974) (emphasizing the 
importance of context in the analysis of legal institutions and warning against misusing compara-
tive law for law reform, particularly in the area of labor regulation). 
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contract can be modified by a variety of statutes, with restrictions or 
compulsory clauses that affect the parties’ rights and obligations. More-
over, judicial decisions can modify or invalidate contract rules in whole 
or in part. This is true in every legal system, where judicial interpreta-
tion fills in gaps, conflicts, and ambiguities present in the legal mate-
rials.100 In the field of employment and labor law, courts have played a 
crucial role in defining the extent and limits of employers’ and workers’ 
rights.101 Finally, collective agreements, where employers and em-
ployees bargain to increase or decrease their respective rights and obli-
gations, can govern employment relations in a whole industry or region, 
adding a layer of regulation to the respective common law rule or em-
ployment statute. DB does not fully account for these alternative 
sources. 
2. Attention to Law in Action 
Comparing legal institutions requires considering not only formal law 
but also its enforcement to determine the actual normative order in ef-
fect.102 If we want to know how law is affecting the behavior of em-
ployers and employees, we will need to know something about how 
well institutions and affected parties enforce that law. How effective are 
the mechanisms of enforcement? How costly are they when compared 
to the alternatives? What is the incidence of offended parties obtaining 
legal remedies?103 
3. Attention to Informal or Nonlegal Norms 
The legal order interacts with other social norms that significantly af-
fect behavior. Legal sociology has made us aware of the fact that infor-
mal norms play an important role in enforcing expectations and in pro-
viding certainty and calculability in transactions.104 These norms can be 
                                                          
100. For classic statements of this proposition, see Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurispru-
dence—The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930); Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in 
Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910). 
101. Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern 
Legal Consciousness, 1937–1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978); see generally Estlund, supra 
note 6, at 1530–35; Getman, supra note 6, at 126–27. 
102. In June 2008, the Independent Evaluation Group of the World Bank confirmed that the 
Doing Business indicators can be misleading because they only measure the law as it is written. 
See INDEPENDENT EVALUATION GROUP, supra note 93, at xv. The group also warned “that most 
of the methodological limitations can and should be addressed promptly, lest they undermine [the 
indicators’] credibility. Inaccurate nomenclature should be rectified and the DB reports should not 
overstate claims of causality and the indicators’explanatory power.” Id. at xvii. 
103. See Llewellyn, supra note 100; Pound, supra note 100. 
104. For a classic study in this tradition, see Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in 
Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963). 
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as important as formal norms in defining the regulatory floor that parties 
consider binding upon them at any given moment.105 A comparison that 
ignores this normative order is at risk of missing an important layer of 
regulation affecting social behavior.106 
B. The Method’s Problems: The Examples of the United States and 
Mexico 
In order to illustrate how these omissions can translate into misrepre-
sentations of rigidity or flexibility, I take a few examples from Mexico 
and the United States, two countries that DB places on opposite sides of 
the flexibility spectrum. While DB considers the United States to have 
one of the most flexible employment regulation environments,107 Mex-
ico scores very high in labor rigidity.108 Mexico is also situated in the 
region that scores the lowest in labor flexibility,109 and it belongs to the 
civil law tradition, which (according to DB) is a bad omen for economic 
performance. 
Consider each of the categories of employment regulation analyzed 
by DB: hiring, working conditions, and firing. 
1. Hiring 
DB classifies Mexico as having rigid employment regulation, en-
shrined in a default permanent employment contract.110 The Mexican 
labor law allows for fixed-term contracts only for a year and under the 
condition that the nature of the job be temporary.111 On this feature, 
Mexico would score a 100.112 
If we look at other sources of law,113 however, we find that fixed-
term contracts are more common than we might imagine. The civil code 
                                                          
105. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE 
DISPUTES 1–11 (1991). 
106. Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal 
Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974). 
107. In 2009, DB ranked the United States first in the employing workers index, which meas-
ures flexibility in hiring and firing, among other things. See DOING BUSINESS 2009, supra note 
42, at 143. 
108. Id. at 120 (ranking Mexico 141 out of 181 countries in the employing workers index, 
which means high labor rigidities according to the DB methodology). 
109. For the region’s rank in DB, see WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS 2009: LATIN 
AMERICA 2–10 (1998). 
110. DOING BUSINESS 2004, supra note 41, at 34. For Mexico’s score, see supra Table 2. 
111. See Ley Federal del Trabajo [L.F.T] [Federal Labor Law], as amended, arts. 35–39, 40, 
Diario Oficial de la Federación [D.O.], 17 de Enero de 2006 (Mex.) [hereinafter FLL]. 
112. See DOING BUSINESS 2004, supra note 41. 
113. Mexico’s FLL is a comprehensive regulation that establishes minimum labor protec-
tions, but some scholars have estimated that it does not encompass more than twenty percent of 
labor relations. The remaining eighty percent would be comprised of collective agreements, labor 
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contains several provisions that, while not specifically intended for em-
ployment relationships, are very often so applied. An employee may be 
hired under the guise of being self-employed and offering a service to a 
buyer for an honorarium, with a temporary contract in which the em-
ployee receives no employment benefits since she is outside the protec-
tive ambit of labor law.114 The Federal Labor Law (FLL) presumes an 
employment contract subject to all rights and obligations recognized by 
the law whenever there is an employment relationship.115 Employers, 
however, often resort to civil contracts to bypass labor legislation and 
reduce costs.116 The use of these practices has increased considerably, 
with companies employing more than eighty percent of their labor force 
through hiring “confidential” employees, who occupy a position of trust 
and are therefore exempt from the just-cause regime, or using civil con-
tracts.117 Similarly, it has not been uncommon for unions to agree to 
fixed-term and temporary contracts in collective agreements for a per-
centage of the workforce, even when the duration of the job could be 
indeterminate.118 
Furthermore, even though the FLL explicitly seeks to avoid the use 
of intermediation or subcontracting to impinge upon employees’ bene-
fits,119 firms often bypass their statutory employment obligations by es-
tablishing subsidiaries, thereby weakening the unions and substantially 
                                                                                                                                      
customs, or informal agreements. See Arturo Alcalde & Bertha Luján, Cómo viven la democracia 
los trabajadores mexicanos, in LA DEMOCRACIA DE LOS ABAJO 91, 103 (Jorge Alonso & Juan 
Manuel Ramírez eds., 1997). 
114. See GRACIELA BENSUSÁN, EL MODELO MEXICANO DE REGULACIÓN LABORAL 263–
264 (2000) [hereinafter BENSUSÁN, EL MODELO MEXICANO]. 
115. See FLL art. 35. 
116. As is evidenced by the radical reduction in the number of formal, written labor contracts 
in small and medium-sized businesses, as well as in the maquiladora sector. A maquiladora is a 
factory or assembly plant, operating under a preferential tariff program, which imports inputs to 
manufacture or assemble products that are then exported out of the country. One of its main ob-
jectives is to take advantage of comparatively cheaper labor in the assembling country. See 
JANINE BERG, CHRISTOPH ERNST & PETER AUER, MEETING THE EMPLOYMENT CHALLENGE: 
ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, AND MEXICO IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 137–38 (2006). 
117. Alcalde & Luján, supra note 113, at 100. 
118. See BENSUSÁN, EL MODELO MEXICANO, supra note 114, at 263–64; Alfonso Bouzas & 
Enrique de la Garza, Flexibilidad del Trabajo y Contratación Colectiva en México, 60 MÉXICO 
IIE-UNAM-CAMBIO XXI (1998). 
119. According to the FLL, in cases of intermediation, when a person hires or helps to hire 
employees to work for an employer, the beneficiary firm acquires responsibility as employer over 
the employment contract and is required to grant these employees the same benefits as those en-
joyed by its employees performing the same job. FLL art. 14. In the case of outsourcing, if the 
service provider does not fulfill the requirements to fully comply with its obligations as employer, 
the beneficiary firm is jointly responsible. Otherwise, it is the provider and not the beneficiary 
who bears full responsibility over the employment obligations. FLL art. 15. The law requires that 
employees working for the provider enjoy similar conditions to the employees of the beneficiary 
firm. FLL art. 15. 
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reducing labor costs.120 Moreover, outsourcing has often been used as a 
way to mask intermediation and substantially decrease labor costs. 121 
Additionally, firms have found mechanisms to restructure by sever-
ing their relationship with employees who are then rehired by down-
sized firms on a nonpermanent basis. This, in turn, allows firms to avoid 
legal responsibility for the employment contract, substantially reducing 
costs concerning employment benefits and eliminating potential sever-
ance payments.122 
If we turn to the enforcement of the permanent employment contract, 
we realize that employers’ margin of maneuver to decide employment 
duration is in fact extended through a number of channels, such as “im-
precise legislation, judicial interpretation of labor rights, and the lack of 
strong unions that are ready to demand performance and further specify 
those rights in collective agreements.”123 An employer, for instance, can 
impose a temporary contract for what would seemingly be a permanent 
activity, despite a DB score of 100 on this front. This phenomenon ex-
plains why, despite legal rigidity, using temporary contracts is an ex-
tended practice in small and medium-sized firms.124 
Finally, although the law presumes an implied permanent employ-
ment contract whenever there is an employment relationship, there is an 
extended practice in some sectors of the economy by which parties do 
not resort to formal law at any level of their relationship. In these cases, 
hiring conditions are indeed quite flexible, according to the DB authors’ 
definition of flexibility.125 
                                                          
120. Alcalde & Luján, supra note 114. See BENSUSÁN, EL MODELO MEXICANO, supra note 
114, at 287. 
121. Alcalde & Luján, supra note 113, at 98–99. See BENSUSÁN, EL MODELO MEXICANO, 
supra note 114, at 287–89. 
122. See BENSUSÁN, EL MODELO MEXICANO, supra note 114, at 289 (observing that in the 
privatization process in the mid-1980s, many firms bypassed statutory protections for employees, 
which guarantee employer responsibility in case of employer substitution, by closing off and reo-
pening firms with new, more flexible, contracts modifying working conditions and the number of 
jobs). 
123. BENSUSÁN, EL MODELO MEXICANO, supra note 114, at 263 (author’s translation). 
124. Id. at 263. (noting that this practice was adopted to decrease labor costs, even in big 
state-owned enterprises as in the case of temporary workers in the state-owned oil company 
PEMEX). Bensusán also notes that the use of temporary contracts reached 12% of manufacturing 
workers in the 1990s, which would situate Mexico in an intermediate position among OECD 
countries. Id. at 263–64. 
125. See William F. Maloney, Informality Revisited, 32 WORLD DEV. 1159, 1159–60, 1173 
(2004) (arguing that the informal sector is the “unregulated, developing country analogue of the 
voluntary entrepreneurial small firm sector found in advanced countries”). 
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2. Working Conditions 
DB considers three main aspects of working conditions: hours of 
work, leaves, and minimum wage. The less the law imposes require-
ments on any of these fronts, the more flexible it is. There is a great va-
riety of other legal sources dictating employment conditions, however, 
with significant costs for which DB does not account. Consider safety, 
health, and benefits regulations, or think of sexual harassment regula-
tions, anti-discrimination laws, and accommodation mandates. In the 
United States, one of the most flexible countries in the sample, such 
workplace requirements meaningfully affect the employment contract 
and often impose significant costs on employers. DB, however, does not 
account for this pool of regulations. If it did, the United States would 
receive a lower flexibility score than it currently does, and Mexico’s 
score would be higher, since Mexican protection on these fronts is ra-
ther weak.126 
Furthermore, even if we were to focus solely on hours of work, atten-
tion to enforcement is crucial. In Mexico, it is not uncommon to find 
employees working long hours, beyond the maximum number allowed, 
without sanctions for the employer or effective remedies for the em-
ployee.127 
Finally, an increasing array of employment practices such as corpo-
rate codes of conduct,128 which constitute the core of some of the most 
successful transnational strategies by NGOs, labor and consumer groups 
to improve working conditions,129 again create important costs to em-
ployers.130 These norms are often conceived of as soft regulation (in 
contradistinction with hard formal law), but they are binding in the 
sense that they effectively structure parties’ behavior.131 
                                                          
126. See, e.g., Patricia Kurczyn Villalobos, Propuestas para Reformar la Ley Federal del 
Trabajo en Temas de Equidad y Género, in LA REFORMA LABORAL QUE NECESITAMOS 145 
(José Alfonso Bouzas ed., 2004) (arguing for the need to strengthen labor regulation and en-
forcement with respect to anti-discrimination and benefits to achieve gender equality). 
127. Enrique de la Garza Toledo, Estructura industrial y condiciones de trabajo en la manu-
factura, in LA SITUACIÓN DEL TRABAJO EN MÉXICO, 2003, at 251, 263 (Enrique de la Garza & 
Carlos Salas eds., 2004). 
128. See generally Rhys Jenkins, U.N. Research Inst. For Soc. Dev., Corporate Codes of 
Conduct: Self Regulation in a Global Economy, Tech., Bus. & Soc.’y Programme Paper No. 2 
(Apr. 2001), available at http://www.unrisd.org/unrisd/website/document.nsf/0/e3b3e78bab9a88 
6f80256b5e00344278/$FILE/jenkins.pdf. 
129. See, e.g., Bob Hepple, A Race to the Top? International Investment Guidelines and Cor-
porate Codes of Conduct, 20 COMP LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 347 (1999). 
130. For an analysis on the increasing use and potential problems of corporate codes of con-
duct, see Int’l Labor Org., Corporate Codes of Conduct, http://actrav.itcilo.org/actrav-english/ 
telearn/global/ilo/code/main.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2009). 
131. See, e.g., JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 19–
20 (2000); Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 
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3. Firing 
In countries with at-will employment contracts like the United States, 
there are a host of regulations that restrict employers’ leeway to fire, 
such as the National Labor Relations Act and a variety of antidiscrimi-
nation laws regarding gender, race, age, and disabilities.132 Dismissing 
an employee in a manner contrary to any of these laws would be func-
tionally equivalent to unjust dismissal, and would trigger the employer’s 
obligation to reinstate or compensate.133 Compensation in these cases 
can of course be quite expensive.134 In contrast, in countries that, like 
Mexico, have a default just-cause dismissal regime, there are provisions 
in the labor statute or in collective agreements that allow temporal sus-
pension or dismissal in case of economic downturns or technological 
change, making adjustment more flexible (in the DB sense) than surface 
appearances might show.135 
Additionally, looking at enforcement is indispensable for understand-
ing the true costs of firing. In Mexico, for example, it is estimated that 
only six percent of workers who have been unjustly dismissed file a suit 
against their employer.136 This estimate presents a rather different pic-
ture of employers’ burden on firing. Finally, informal practices on firing 
must be considered. Informal practices under a just-cause dismissal re-
gime can establish a de facto contract at will, where no obligation to 
reinstate or pay severance is expected from the employer. For instance, 
despite the law’s stringent compensation requirements for unjust dis-
missal, employers have found ways to cut jobs without paying the price. 
This practice has been particularly visible in simulated bankruptcies 
                                                                                                                                      
105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 322 (2005). For a critical assessment, see generally Adelle Blackett, 
Global Governance, Legal Pluralism and the Decentered State: A Labor Law Critique of Codes 
of Corporate Conduct, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 401 (2000–01). 
132. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful Discharge Protections in an At-Will World, 74 TEX. 
L. REV. 1655–92 (1996) (discussing the multiple exemptions to employment at will emerging 
from common law and statutory regulation). 
133. Id. 
134. See JAMES N. DERTOUZOS ET AL., THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF 
WRONGFUL TERMINATION (1988); DAVID J. JUNG, PUBLIC LAW RESEARCH INSTITUTE, JURY 
VERDICTS IN WRONGFUL TERMINATION CASES (1997), available at http://w3.uchastings.edu/ 
plri/96-97tex/jury.htm; David H. Autor et al., The Costs of Wrongful-Discharge Laws, 88 REV. 
ECON. & STAT. 211, 212–14 (2006). 
135. FLL arts. 426, 434, 437. 
136. GRACIELA BENSUSÁN, DISEÑO LEGAL Y DESEMPEÑO: INSTITUCIONES LABORALES EN 
AMÉRICA LATINA 326 (2006) [hereinafter BENSUSÁN, DISEÑO LEGAL Y DESEMPEÑO]; see also 
Graciela Bensusán, La Distancia Entre Normas y Hechos: Instituciones Laborales en América 
Latina, 2 ARGENTINA MINISTERIO DEL TRABAJO: REVISTA DE TRABAJO 115, 126 (2006), availa-
ble at http://www.trabajo.gov.ar/left/estadisticas/descargas/revistaDeTrabajo//2006n02 
_revistaDeTrabajo/2006n02_a09_gBensusan.pdf [hereinafter Bensusán, La Distancia]. 
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when firms close down plants only to reopen with fewer personnel and 
less favorable employment contracts.137 
IV. TOWARD A NEW APPROACH FOR ANALYZING THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN LABOR LAW AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
The analysis above highlights DB’s shortcomings on the count of de-
scriptive inaccuracy. If one were to recode the DB indicators on em-
ployment regulations, taking into account such factors as other legal 
sources and enforcement levels, it is likely that countries would fare 
quite differently, and the correlation between legal families (common 
law versus civil law) and economic performance would become less 
significant. Indeed, scholars who have recoded DB indicators in corpo-
rate governance have found that the legal origins factor is not rele-
vant.138 
In addition to the inaccurate diagnosis, the further leap to prescription 
on this basis is unwarranted. In this respect, it is crucial to note that even 
though DB readily suggests that civil law countries should reform their 
labor law regimes to mimic common law countries,139 they only corre-
late a country’s regulatory flexibility with that country’s overall wealth, 
using gross national income per capita as an indicator.140 All this corre-
lation tells us, however, is the relationship between a given regulatory 
framework and a country’s current income level. DB’s reform proposals 
amount to extracting whatever legal rules the richest countries currently 
have in place and then asking developing countries to mimic them. 
There is no reference to countries’ historical growth rates.141 More im-
                                                          
137. See BENSUSÁN, BENSUSÁN, EL MODELO MEXICANO, supra note 114, at 266; Alcalde & 
Luján, supra note 113, at 100–01. 
138. See Roe, supra note 44, at 516; Holger Spamann, On the Insignificance and/or Endo-
geneity of La Porta et al.'s 'Anti-Director Rights Index' Under Consistent Coding 69–70 (Harvard 
Law Sch. John M. Olin Ctr., Discussion Paper No. 7, 2006), available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/fellows_papers/pdf/Spamann_7.pdf. 
139. The link here is that common law countries are less heavy regulators, and less heavy 
regulation is correlated with higher income per capita. The project’s recommendations are in line 
with these observations. 
140. See DOING BUSINESS 2009, supra note 42, at 62; DOING BUSINESS 2004, supra note 41, 
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portantly, DB pays no attention to how moments of growth have corre-
lated with changes in regulatory frameworks.142 
Taking these critiques into consideration would make the task of 
comparison more complicated. This, however, is only because the criti-
ques shed light on the complexities of law and of the impact of law on 
social behavior. Therefore, they cannot be ignored if the goal is to rec-
ommend what kind of regulation countries should adopt. Bringing these 
challenges to the debates and policy proposals in economic develop-
ment could help revamp the projects in more promising, if humbler, 
ways. At any rate, these challenges may at least help reduce the confi-
dence with which programs like DB are promoted and the appeal they 
arouse in many developing countries. 
Simply improving the DB indicators, however, is not what I am after 
here. For a project that wishes to pursue a comparison of countries’ em-
ployment law regimes and to investigate their relation to economic 
growth, a different approach altogether is warranted. No matter how so-
phisticated the DB indicators become in capturing law in action, their 
monodimensional definition of “flexibility” is doomed to lead to reduc-
tive description and therefore, problematic prescription. “Flexibility” 
can be understood in many different ways, depending on which charac-
teristics of the legal system or the economy itself are at issue. In the fol-
lowing Sections, I lay the foundations for an alternative descriptive ap-
proach that seeks to capture some of the complexity involved in labor 
regulation in different sectors of the economy. The first step is to un-
pack the various conceptions of flexibility at play. 
A. Unpacking the Legal Meaning of Flexibility 
The DB methodology could be significantly improved if it took into 
account the critiques raised in the previous Part. Even then, though, its 
analytical framework for thinking about flexibility would be of only li-
mited use because it is limited conceptually, empirically, and program-
matically. 
The framework is limited conceptually because it obscures the mean-
ing of flexibility. From the point of view of the parties to the employ-
ment relationship, the DB methodology takes a one-sided perspective 
that looks only at the employer’s ability or disability to define the terms 
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of the contract. From the point of view of the legal regime underpinning 
the employment contract, DB misses the abilities and disabilities that 
the employer has regarding different aspects of that employment con-
tract. By averaging these different abilities and disabilities in the em-
ployment contract (hiring, conditions of employment, and firing) into a 
general flexibility-rigidity indicator, the framework misses the interplay 
between these forms and the tradeoffs that their different combinations 
represent. A labor regime can give employers much flexibility in the fir-
ing and hiring processes, while being quite rigid regarding work hours, 
other employment conditions, and levels of remuneration for preexisting 
employees. What kinds of tradeoffs have labor regimes made, and with 
how much success? 
The DB framework is limited empirically because, as I have shown, 
the flexibility-rigidity scores and rankings tell us very little about what 
type of regime is actually in operation in a given country. Moreover, 
this approach overlooks what seems to be a crucial phenomenon of 
modern economies in both developed and developing countries: every 
country may have several labor regimes coexisting within the same 
economy.143 Each of these regimes may have distinct flexibility fea-
tures, and each may underpin several different economic sectors that 
vary in size, importance, and contribution to any given economy. As 
will become clear, the DB framework not only misses a rich contextual 
analysis, but also moves us further away from one. 
Finally, the DB approach is limited programmatically because its 
reform proposals stem from a confused conceptual analysis and descrip-
tion of labor regimes. A reform proposal that is based on such study is 
doomed to be limited at best. Despite the enthusiasm and self-
confidence surrounding the study (which have made DB a best seller)—
or because of the enthusiasm and self-confidence—I engage in a careful 
consideration of the reform proposals and warn against unwarranted ex-
pectations. 
In Part IV.B, I analyze the different conceptions at play in the flex-
ibility rhetoric, which I call formal, substantive, and organizational. The 
analysis of these conceptions will help clarify and delimit the specific 
sense in which DB conceives of flexibility. 
In Part IV.C, I construct a typology of three kinds of labor regimes 
that legal norms can create, by combining flexibility and rigidity, for the 
parties involved in the employment contract. I use these ideal types to 
argue that different labor regimes may and often do co-exist within the 
same economy. 
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In Part V, I illustrate the existence of these ideal types by looking at 
the case of Mexico. This is a particularly useful example because the 
country has undergone a process of economic liberalization and restruc-
turing that has integrated its market into the global economy. At the 
same time, the country’s labor and employment regulation was long 
considered inherently progressive and instrumental in creating the cor-
poratist system under which the country industrialized during the period 
of import substitutions. Moreover, in the last two decades, there has 
been an ongoing debate about the reform of Mexican labor law, which 
has provoked bitter disagreements and many reform proposals. By many 
accounts, including DB’s, Mexico’s regulation—with its just-cause 
dismissal regime and generous workers’ rights—is considered to have 
one of the most rigid labor regulations in the world and to be in urgent 
need of flexibility to make the economy internationally competitive. For 
all these reasons, this case presents a fertile ground for analysis consi-
dering the relationship between labor regulation and economic devel-
opment in the context of increasing market liberalization. 
B. Three Conceptions at Play in the Flexibility Rhetoric 
The aim of this Section is to unpack the concept of flexibility and 
analyze its various legal meanings. What do scholars and policymakers 
mean when they talk about more or less flexible legal regimes? Is this 
vocabulary helpful? Both proponents and opponents of flexibility pro-
ceed as if there existed, legally speaking, a single type of flexible or ri-
gid rules. Instead, I identify three conceptions of flexibility at play in 
current debates about labor market regulation. I call these conceptions 
(1) formal flexibility, (2) substantive flexibility, and (3) organizational 
flexibility. These distinctions are important from an analytical point of 
view because they enable a clearer discussion of what the claims for 
flexibility stand for, and how they translate into a legal regime. 
1. Formal Flexibility 
The first conception of flexibility, which I call formal, refers to the 
internal characteristics of the legal norms. These characteristics deter-
mine whether a norm is clear and cognizable in the abstract, or whether 
it calls for a contextual analysis. In legal theory, rules and standards are 
representative of the most common differences among formal characte-
ristics. Whereas rules are usually considered easy to interpret and en-
force, standards are deemed to require a contextual analysis that takes 
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into consideration a broader set of factors.144 Thus, from a conceptual 
perspective, rules are rigid and standards are flexible.145 
2. Substantive Flexibility 
In this conception, flexibility refers to the ways in which a norm 
enables or restricts the conduct of the parties in a legal relationship rec-
ognized by law. This analysis looks, from the participants’ point of 
view, at the legal regime that regulates the employment relationship. 
Understood in this sense, flexibility becomes a matter of perspective, 
and the question “flexibility for whom?” appears unavoidable.146 This 
conception of flexibility ultimately refers to power and its allocation. A 
given norm could give more or less power and, hence, more or less flex-
ibility to the employer or the employee in interactions at every level of 
the employment relationship.147 
3. Organizational Flexibility 
The third conception of flexibility refers to organizational changes in 
the production process resulting from technological developments, new 
forms of industrial organization, greater international competition, and 
changes in the configuration of the labor market. Firms need to be more 
flexible if they want to succeed in this post-Fordist era: quicker in ad-
justing to economic cycles, readier to cope with international competi-
tion, and lighter, in order to move wherever costs are cheaper.148 
Changes in the organization of production include new ways of manag-
ing employment relations. Often, firms will require a more participative 
workforce, with a richer set of skills, involved in decision making. Hie-
rarchical relations are less vertically and more horizontally organized, 
with work resembling team work.149 Two prominent reasons for restruc-
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turing the production process are the need for cooperation and the desire 
to innovate.150 
4. DB’s Uses of Flexibility 
The three conceptions of flexibility I have described are analytically 
distinguishable, and their exposition aims to clarify DB’s claims about 
labor market flexibility. When DB claims that a more flexible legal re-
gime will lead to higher employment levels and economic development, 
it is not clear that it refers to all three of these conceptions. Even when 
the appeal to labor flexibility may seem to refer to all three levels, flex-
ibility for contextual interpretation, flexibility for the employer to act as 
she pleases, and flexibility in the firm’s productive process need not 
be—and indeed often are not—consonant with one another. 
At first sight, the DB arguments for labor flexibility do not seem to 
refer to the formal characteristics of the legal norms. After all, what DB 
considers to be the most rigid legal provision, the just-cause dismissal 
norm,151 is a standard that allows for plenty of flexibility in interpreta-
tion. Similarly, many compulsory clauses in the employment contract 
introduced by statute or case law, such as good faith or presumption of 
implicit contract, are formally flexible standards.152 DB, however, 
deems these flexible standards to be “rigid” labor rules. In contrast, it 
considers the legal provision for dismissal at will, which is formally a 
rigid rule that allows little room for interpretation, to be a flexible labor 
provision.153 Thus, the conception of flexibility used by DB does not re-
fer to the formal characteristics of legal commands that rules or stan-
dards embody. 
DB, however, draws on a larger scholarly project in comparative law, 
called legal origins theory, which asserts the importance of the formal 
characteristics of norms in development.154 More concretely, this theory 
argues that a crucial difference between common law and civil law is 
that the former is composed of general principles or standards, whereas 
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the latter contains bright-line rules.155 This difference, according to the 
theory, has important implications for the functioning of legal systems, 
particularly in terms of the degree of discretion in adjudication and con-
trol over the judiciary by the executive power. These differences in legal 
systems, in turn, allegedly produce important social and economic con-
sequences, which manifest themselves in better overall performance in 
common law countries. 
According to the DB work on labor law, common law or English-
origin countries have the most flexible regulation and perform better 
than civil law countries.156 Absent from this discussion, however, is the 
argument that standards are better, because they enable more room for 
interpretation, are more contextual, and allow a legal evolution that re-
sponds to local needs. In this case, DB champions the legal norm of 
dismissal at will,157 which is a bright-line rule and not a just-cause stan-
dard. 
The formal characteristics of norms and, in particular, the distinction 
between rules and standards have played an important role in other 
areas of the law and development literature.158 In the labor aspect of 
DB, however, the norms’ formal characteristics—whether they allow 
more or less room for interpretative discretion, or whether they are more 
or less open to contextual analysis—do not seem to be important. What 
matters most seems to be what the norm—rule or standard—enables the 
contracting parties to do: the contract practices opened or foreclosed by 
the norm. The focus is on the relative positions of employers and em-
ployees in a legal regime, and the foreseeable economic outcomes that 
such a position would yield in the productive process.159 Thus, in the 
DB proposals to make labor regulation more flexible, the substantive 
conception of norms seems more important. 
DB proposes that economic development requires a labor law regime 
that gives flexibility—that is, more power—to employers in the em-
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ployment contract. In other words, the argument is that increasing the 
power of employers to hire and fire employees without restrictions, to 
organize the workplace with no limitations, and to pay the wages they 
wish, will improve firms’ economic performance thereby creating jobs 
and allowing the country’s economy to grow. It is important to clarify 
that when DB proposes to make labor law more flexible, it uses a subs-
tantive conception of flexibility, and is, in effect, arguing for increasing 
employers’ power, although it presents the case for flexibility in more 
ambiguous terms. 
As regards organizational flexibility, DB very often uses “flexibility” 
interchangeably in the substantive and organizational aspects. For in-
stance, DB claims that flexibility on the part of the employer in deter-
mining contract terms leads to an adaptable firm.160 For DB, more pow-
er to employers means more adaptability. Therefore, substantive 
flexibility equals organizational flexibility. Adaptability in the new 
economy, however, is a separate claim for which DB ought to be able to 
argue rather than gesture towards by rhetorically conflating these two 
different concepts of flexibility. Indeed, it is possible to imagine an em-
ployer who enjoys considerable flexibility in employment relationships, 
while simultaneously having a rigid production process, with a com-
mand-and-control organization characterized by workers’ repetitive 
deployment of very limited skills. This firm is unable to cope with in-
creasing market competition and technological innovation. By the same 
token, one could imagine an employer with a more rigid employment 
contractual framework, but with a more flexible mode of production, 
heavy investment in employees’ skills, and a cooperative workplace 
where workers participate in decision-making. This firm could be suc-
cessful at innovation. 
In the next Section, I will analyze in more depth the substantive con-
ception of flexibility, developing more fully the varieties of flexibility 
possible in the employment contract from the point of view of both em-
ployers and employees. The point is to prepare the ground for an ap-
proach that will offer the opportunity to capture the coexistence of mul-
tiple labor law regimes within the same country. 
C. Multiple Combinations of Substantive Legal Regimes 
The substantive conception of flexibility is central to the proposals to 
make labor regulation more flexible. At the core of the DB reform 
agenda for flexibility lies an interest in how rules affect the relative po-
sition of the parties in the bargaining situation. The goal is to eliminate 
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current legal restrictions on employers’ bargaining power in the em-
ployment contract. The legal framework structuring the employment 
contract is deemed rigid because it limits employers’ ability to hire, fire, 
and establish employment conditions according to their own prefe-
rences. 
What I propose in this Section is to embrace the interest in the effects 
of legal norms on bargaining, but remedy the one-sided perspective with 
which it is currently expressed. This analysis draws on a legal realist 
methodology in order to investigate how norms structure the bargaining 
possibilities for parties in an employment relationship.161 The goal of 
this Section is to clarify that a legal regime cannot generally be deemed 
more or less flexible. A key question becomes: more flexible or more 
rigid for whom? In this way, we can begin to understand more clearly 
what DB means when it diagnoses a particular country’s regulation as 
having a high overall rate of flexibility or rigidity. A proposal to move 
towards flexibility in any direction would need to justify why giving 
more flexibility to one party would be more desirable than the alterna-
tive. 
In order to capture this bargaining perspective, we need a more com-
plex approach than the DB rigidity-flexibility index. I suggest that we 
consider regulation as composed of ideal types, which combine flex-
ibility and rigidity in different ways. This approach entails reconceptua-
lizing flexibility and rigidity in terms of the full set of options available 
to employers and employees in their employment relationships. I offer 
three possible legal regimes, according to how norms operate to grant 
flexibility or rigidity to employers and employees. 
Type I: Employee Friendly—Maximizes Bargaining Power of 
Workers 
This regime includes legal rigidities that exert considerable pressure 
on employers’ freedom of contract. These rigidities include compulsory 
clauses and statutes that impose restrictions at every level of the em-
ployment relationship. On the other hand, this regime also contains rules 
that grant considerable flexibility to workers in setting contract condi-
tions for hiring, hours, wages and nonwage benefits, and firing. 
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Type II: Employer Friendly—Maximizes Bargaining Power of 
Employers 
Rules that give employers flexibility compose this ideal type. In this 
regime, employers have them substantial control over many aspects of 
the employment relationship, such as hiring, working conditions, and 
firing, while limiting worker resistance through rigid rules. These rules 
include restrictions on forms of union organization, limits on engaging 
with union activities, and limitations on the right to strike, such as the 
imposition of restrictions or criminalization. 
Type III: Free-for-all—All Privileges and Relatively Few Rights 
This ideal type is a regime that, in Hohfeldian terms, grants privileges 
and only few rights to each party.162 Both employers and workers are 
free to use their power as they please in their employment relationship, 
while neither group has an entitlement to demand state protection from 
the other party’s actions. This does not mean, however, that this regime 
operates in a vacuum. Quite significantly, relations in this regime oper-
ate in the context of background rules of private law—such as property, 
contract, and torts—and criminal law, which affect parties’ bargaining 
possibilities. 
These three models can coexist within a single economy. The de-
scriptive task is to map their size and distribution among different sec-
tors. The typical scenario in a developing country is a dual economy 
composed of vanguard and rearguard sectors.163 The vanguard sector is 
closer to an employee-friendly regime (Type I), characterized by high 
capital investment, such as the manufacturing and energy industries. 
The rearguard sector has an employer-friendly regime (Type II), where 
labor and capital inputs are more elastic, and a free-for-all regime (Type 
III), which is generally associated with the informal economy. 
DB’s proposals for labor flexibility argue—implicitly yet decided-
ly—for the introduction of an employer-friendly regime, resembling 
Type II. The implicit assumption behind this proposal is that the more 
leeway employers enjoy, the more productive firms will be, but it is far 
from clear that a regime giving all powers to employers and none to 
employees would actually achieve this outcome. Such an underlying 
claim does not seem to enjoy full or undisputed theoretical or empirical 
support. It is not hard to imagine that high levels of productivity can be 
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achieved under different combinations of legal regimes. Arguably, quite 
different legal regimes could enable comparably productive outcomes. 
The analysis I propose is useful for at least three reasons. First, it 
shows how current proposals to introduce flexibility in the labor market 
embody a very narrow view of flexibility. These proposals consider on-
ly one side of the relationship: that of the employers. My framework, in 
contrast, forces proponents of flexibility to make their position explicit 
amidst a set of other flexible alternatives. Second, this analysis clarifies 
that a variety of labor legal regimes, exemplified by the ideal types, can 
coexist within the same economy and the same country. This insight 
shows that using aggregate national scores to describe legal regimes 
may be misleading. It may lead us to inaccurate characterizations as to 
whether a country’s labor market is flexible or rigid, obscuring the dif-
ferent ways in which these types of regulation can combine. Finally, this 
analysis could illuminate how countries that have experienced signifi-
cant growth rates have combined these different pockets of legal re-
gimes across sectors, and with what results. This provides a different 
way of comparing countries’ regulations and experiences. It allows in-
sight on how different legal regimes have combined to yield productive 
scenarios and may serve as better guidance for development strategy. 
Thus, the key question may be not whether given levels of productivity 
can be achieved, but who bears the costs of those productivity levels. 
Proponents and opponents of a given legal regime would need to argue 
in detail why their favored arrangement would be more attractive than 
its alternatives. 
The labor market comprises a set of legal institutions that can take 
different forms depending on each country’s economic conditions and 
political regime. Thus, the analytical framework proposed here rejects 
the insistence on the need for harmonization and the promotion of a 
one-size-fits-all approach to legal reform. The legal rules underpinning 
the market take different forms as they embody each society’s own 
ideals and aspirations as to how to organize production and distribution 
of resources.164 Moreover, economic growth seems to have been 
achieved through a variety of different arrangements, which need not 
converge in all countries.165 On the contrary, these arrangements would 
likely differ depending on each country’s preexisting framework. The 
first step in the analysis would, therefore, consist of breaking down each 
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country’s economy into its constitutive sectors. I will discuss the case of 
Mexico here in order to illustrate the importance of capturing the exis-
tence of a dual economy with a rearguard and a vanguard sector for bet-
ter understanding labor law regulation. Finally, I will analyze how the 
DB reform proposal would transform the existing legal regimes and 
what its possible effects on the related economic sectors may be. The 
analytical framework shows how “flexibility” does not have a single 
meaning with regard to labor regimes. 
V. APPLYING A NEW ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
My objective in this Part is to illustrate the importance of a thicker 
description of the actual legal regimes in force in a given market. Tak-
ing the case of Mexico, I highlight the differences between an account 
of the country’s regulation that relies on the DB methodology and one 
that is more contextual. I use my typology to look at how Types I, II, 
and III are distributed within the same economy. I then contrast this ap-
proach to the flexibility-rigidity index used by DB and argue that the 
latter does not provide a helpful diagnosis on which to base a legal 
reform, or even simply compare. Finally, I conclude by exploring the 
claims that motivate DB’s research and reform proposals. I argue that 
neither these claims nor their reform proposals are warranted. I contend 
that these claims can raise misleading expectations about results that 
may be impossible to obtain through the particular reforms that DB pro-
poses. There may be, in addition, important downsides to the type of 
reform advanced by DB, which are not explicit in the project and are in 
need of serious consideration, such as an increase in social insecurity 
and dislocation, with potential negative effects. Lastly, there are huge 
opportunity costs for countries with limited public budgets. 
A. Law in Action 
As previously noted, DB ranks Mexico’s labor regulation as highly 
rigid.166 Indeed, according to the DB indicators, it has one of the most 
rigid regulations in Latin America,167 the region with the most countries 
with rigid labor regulation in the world.168 This discouraging score 
would suggest that employers’ ability to contract in terms that are fa-
vorable to them is utterly restricted, and that firms face serious opera-
tional limitations. To begin with numerical flexibility, DB’s indicators 
would suggest that firms are severely restricted in the terms in which 
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they can hire employees, the default rule being on a permanent basis.169 
Similarly, low scores in flexibility in firing would indicate that dismiss-
ing an employee is difficult and costly. Employees can only be fired for 
a just cause, and discharging a worker has important compensation de-
terrents for the employer. The result of such a regime would be an 
economy where firms employ their workers on a permanent basis, and 
where there are large barriers to entering and exiting the labor market. 
There would be very limited mobility from the wage-based workforce to 
the self-employed or unemployed workforces and vice versa. Conse-
quently, most employees would have a permanent job, there would be 
relatively low discharges, and overall, firms’ turnover rate would be 
low. 
In operation, Mexico’s law interaction with labor actors and labor in-
stitutions looks strikingly different. Indeed, it has often been observed 
that Mexico’s is among the most protective labor regulations, but that 
these regulations remain largely under-enforced. During the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) negotiations, the lack of 
worker protection and labor standards, at least as compared to the Unit-
ed States, was often considered to be an unfair advantage of Mexico vis-
à-vis the United States. This de facto “flexibility” of employers in the 
Mexican labor system prompted bitter opposition to NAFTA from Unit-
ed States producers and the American labor movement, who feared that 
jobs in the United States would be lost to cheaper labor in Mexico.170 In 
response, the Clinton administration proposed the North American 
Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC),171 entrusted with the task 
of helping monitor and enforce each country’s own labor regulations.172 
In accordance with this observation, the apparent rigidity in hiring 
that DB describes (a score of 77)173 contrasts with the considerable size 
of the wage-based population working temporary or part-time jobs with 
no stability in employment.174 Regarding firing, moreover, dismissals 
seem to be much more common than such rigid indicators would pre-
                                                          
169. FLL Art. 35. 
170. See Lance Compa, NAFTA's Labour Side Agreement Five Years On: Progress and 
Prospects for the NAALC, 1 CAN. LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1, 1–30 (1999); Rainer Dombois et al., 
Transnational Labor Regulation in the NAFTA—A problem of Institutional Design? The Case of 
the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation Between the USA, Mexico and Canada, 19 
INT’L J. COMP. LABOUR L. & INDUS. REL. 421 (2003). 
171. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 
I.L.M. 1499. 
172. For a review of NAALC, see Stephen F. Diamond, Labor Rights in the Global Economy: 
A Case Study of the North American Free Trade Agreement, in HUMAN RIGHTS, LABOR 
RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE (Lance Compa & Stephen Diamond eds., 1996). 
173. DOING BUSINESS 2004, supra note 41, at 36. 
174. See De la Garza, supra note 127, at 263. See also BENSUSÁN, EL MODELO MEXICANO, 
supra note 114, at 281. 
86 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 50:1 
dict.175 The average cost of discharging a worker without just cause 
turns out to be low on average.176 Finally, the country actually has one 
of the highest turnover rates in the region, reaching almost 45% per 
year.177 This mobility across sectors indicates that wage, labor, and em-
ployment benefits are insufficient incentives to prevent workers from 
leaving the formal sector for other less-protected sectors. This pheno-
menon would seem to suggest that firing and mobility across the formal 
and informal sectors are far more common than depicted by DB. 
As for conditions of employment, the DB indicators show Mexico as 
a country with rigid regulations, imposing limitations on the maximum 
workable number of hours per day and requiring overtime pay if hours 
are exceeded or if work is performed on nonworking days. These rigidi-
ties are intended to contribute to workers’ welfare, but in reality, DB ar-
gues, they affect employers’ capacity to adjust to demand and supply 
cycles, many of which are related to seasonal production.178 The impli-
cation is that, in DB’s view, workers would rather work long hours or at 
unusual times in formal jobs than work in the informal economy. Upon 
closer inspection, however, Mexico’s labor force registers very high 
rates of working hours.179 At the same time, a significant part of the 
working population works fifteen hours or less a week.180 While the 
normal working schedule, comprising thirty-five to forty-eight hours a 
week, represents 55% of the population, 21.5% work more than forty-
eight hours a week, and 20.5% work less than thirty-five hours.181 These 
data suggest that firms enjoy much more leeway in their use of labor 
than DB recognizes. 
Finally, concerning wage-based flexibility, DB argues that minimum 
wage laws artificially inflate the price of labor over the market price and 
thus prevent firms from hiring more workers, hurting especially women 
and young would-be workers.182 Mexico has a variety of minimum 
wage laws depending on region and sector, and on this category, the DB 
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indicators give it a high rigidity ranking.183 Nevertheless, real wages in 
the country have dramatically declined in the last twenty-five years, due 
to a series of economic crises: real minimum wages in 2000 were a third 
of what they were in 1980.184 This decline in real wages has made labor 
costs quite low for firms, giving them ample flexibility to hire according 
to their needs. Indeed, the decline has been so stark that many scholars 
call this phenomenon the precarization of labor,185 and it has dramatical-
ly decreased income levels of wage workers with permanent jobs.186 
Comparing a country’s formal law with its law in operation raises 
important questions about the accuracy with which indicators based on 
law in the books, like the DB indicators, can capture and describe an ex-
isting labor legal regime. Thus, the differences between the indicators 
and the actual legal regime in place may cast doubt upon the reliability 
of the description as a basis for a country’s diagnoses and its reform 
prognosis. What can we learn from the relationship between a country’s 
economic performance and its alleged degree of flexibility or rigidity 
according to these indicators? These indicators also raise questions of 
comparability between countries. If they do not accurately describe a 
country’s existing legal regime, how can they be useful in comparing 
two different legal regimes? 
A recent study of labor regimes in four Latin American countries 
concluded that the usefulness of indicators like those constructed by DB 
remains limited, even when they come close to accurately reflecting the 
rights and conditions formally protected by law. This is because they 
obscure important factors about the hold of these legal protections in the 
reality of employment relations.187 The study looks at the labor regimes 
of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. These four Latin American 
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countries share important commonalities in their legal systems and their 
recent economic and political transitions. They all introduced labor-
related laws early in the twentieth century and have gone through dem-
ocratic and market-oriented reforms that have exerted significant pres-
sures on their labor laws and institutions.188 Considering the average of 
individual and collective rights indexes, as built by Botero and others,189 
the study obtained scores indicating which countries would arguably 
have the highest levels of protection. Mexico came first (1.24), followed 
by Chile (1.06), Brazil (0.98), and Argentina (0.92).190 As the authors of 
this study make clear, though, these averages hide important differenc-
es. 
The study highlights the paradox that Chile appears to rank higher in 
levels of protection than Argentina and Brazil, two countries that actual-
ly have higher levels of protection in individual and collective rights.191 
In contrast, although Mexico comes first in levels of protection, it is 
generally recognized that it has the least effective labor laws.192 This 
situation is recognized by the highest labor authorities in the govern-
ment and is a shared perception, as interviews with representatives of 
professional, business, and union circles indicate.193 
The study builds a complementary index aimed at measuring the ef-
fectiveness of legislation based on how laws are actually implemented. 
This index contains seven indicators relating to: social security coverage 
rate; coverage of the inspection system, capacity to detect nonregistered 
jobs or jobs without benefits; and labor justice (length of trials, judg-
ments in favor of workers, enforced judgments, and rate of individual 
conflicts).194 
Once the cost indicators for compliance and effectiveness levels are 
combined, it turns out that degree of effectiveness is generally not re-
lated with a high or low degree of legal protection.195 For instance, 
Chile and Mexico have the lowest degrees of effectiveness. Whereas 
Chile has the lowest degree of legal protection in several categories, 
Mexico enjoys the highest. Legislation in both countries is weakly en-
forced, however. In contrast, Argentina and Brazil both have medium 
labor protection costs and enjoy a high level of effectiveness. The study 
attributes these results to stronger unions and higher effectiveness of la-
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bor inspection and labor justice in these countries. Conversely, Mexico 
and Chile’s minimal effectiveness is related to poor performance in la-
bor inspection and labor justice, in addition to Mexico’s low degree of 
union autonomy and democracy and Chile’s weak union movement.196 
As this comparative analysis makes clear, indices that are exclusively 
based on the law as it exists in the books are clearly insufficient and po-
tentially misleading if they are not corrected by the actual enforcement 
of such norms. Moreover, in looking at the legal regimes in operation, 
the study points out important actors, such as unions, and institutions, 
such as labor inspection and labor courts, that determine the effective-
ness of the labor regime.197 This conclusion should come as no surprise. 
After all, socio-legal studies have long made us aware of the importance 
of looking at actors and institutions to understand how a given legal re-
gime affects behavior.198 
Understanding that there are gaps between the law in books and the 
law in action, however, is not sufficient for studying the relationship be-
tween labor regulation and economic development. Our contextual ex-
amination is still in need of better analytics for describing and categoriz-
ing a country’s labor law regime. We need to distinguish between the 
three different types of possible labor law regimes and try to understand 
into which type each sector of the economy falls. 
B. Mapping Multiple Labor Regimes in Mexico 
In contrast to the DB indicators, which assume a single national labor 
regime that can be deemed rigid or flexible in the aggregate, I argue that 
different labor regimes can coexist within a single country. In Mexico, 
for instance, we can discern three types of labor regimes underpinning 
different sectors of the economy, each contributing in a different way to 
the country’s economic performance. 
There is considerable evidence of a phenomenon of polarization in 
Mexico’s economy in which a few firms have been able to take full ad-
vantage of global markets while others have largely lagged behind. For 
instance, a study about the models of industrialization in Mexico con-
cluded that “the industrial system was highly polarized measured by le-
vels of technology, workforce organization and management, labor rela-
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tions, labor force characteristics, and firms’ forward and backward lin-
kages.”199 The purpose of this Section is to analyze how these three op-
erating labor law regimes connect to these different poles of the econo-
my. 
 This process of polarization is reflected in an economy divided be-
tween vanguard and rearguard poles.200 In Mexico, this division usually 
takes place along firm size lines. Firms of different size stand in stark 
contrast to one another regarding capital investment, technological de-
velopment, and modes of production. Generally, firms in the vanguard 
have undergone economic restructuring, boast greater investment in 
technology, and have adopted “total quality” and “just in time” systems 
of production.201 These firms comprise a small percentage of large-scale 
firms, which have reaped the benefits of freer trade and economic libe-
ralization. They compete in the global economy and finance themselves 
in the international markets. These firms are dynamic exporters but also 
active importers of their inputs. In fact, they are largely disconnected 
from the domestic industrial sector.202 In contrast, the rearguard is com-
prised of large and medium-sized firms that continue to use Fordist or 
Taylorist modes of production, and have not undergone economic re-
structuring. It also comprises medium and small-sized firms with un-
scientific modes of production and low to medium technology.203 These 
firms produce primarily for the domestic market.204 
I argue here that the small vanguard pole of the economy is under-
pinned mostly by an employee-friendly regime, which is significant in 
that it directly contradicts DB’s prediction. The most productive sector 
of the economy seems to be in fact the most rigid. The vast rearguard 
pole of the economy comprises all types of labor regimes: the em-
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ployee-friendly, employer-friendly and free-for-all, which underpin dif-
ferent economic sectors. It is important to note that these types of labor 
regimes are ideal types, which find no exact match in reality. However, 
they are useful analytical tools to understand the various labor regimes 
operating in Mexico and their connection to various economic sectors. 
1. The Employee-friendly Regime 
Characteristic sectors in this labor regime include manufacturing, ex-
tractive industries, electricity, and the public sector. These sectors em-
ploy about 20% of the workforce. The manufacturing industry is the 
most important sector in the economy and has become the main engine 
of economic growth since the country opened its economy to the global 
market.205 In 2000, production in the manufacturing industry 
represented 28.7% of total domestic product, surpassed only by com-
merce, restaurant, and hotel services.206 The manufacturing industry 
contributes the most to the country’s exports. In 2000, it represented 
87.3% of total exports.207 Within the manufacturing industry, the most 
dynamic sectors are automobile and auto-parts, electric and electronic, 
and machinery and special equipment, which represent 67.3% of total 
exports.208 Within the manufacturing sector itself, we can find firms di-
vided between vanguard and rearguard poles of the economy, often 
along size lines.209 
Permanent jobs, under a just-cause dismissal rule, characterize the 
employee-friendly labor regime. Long-term employees are still a major-
ity in the manufacturing industry, with no significant growth in other 
types of contracting such as temporary, hourly, subcontracting, or hono-
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rarium.210 Firms appear to have little incentive to move toward a scheme 
of greater flexibility and the job instability that comes with it. Firms’ 
lack of interest may be explained by widespread low wages, training 
problems, and the prevalent corporatist unionism which offers little pro-
tection to the rank and file, making the status quo more appealing.211 
Labor flexibility has been available through the decline of real wages 
despite the formal rigidity of legal protections on hiring, firing and 
working conditions. Total remuneration for employees in the manufac-
turing sector decreased 45.9% in real terms between 1988 and 1998 in 
all firm sizes, hitting employees in the smaller firms harder.212 Even 
when real wages began to rise in 2000, recovering from the 1995 crisis, 
by 2001, wages had not regained 1994 levels.213 The fall of real wages 
benefited manufacturing firms by significantly decreasing their labor 
costs. Indeed, during the 1990s, labor costs as a proportion of total 
overall manufacturing costs registered a considerable decline. In large-
scale firms, labor costs represented only 16.9% of total costs in 1994, 
compared to 24.7% in 1989.214 
2. The Employer-friendly Regime 
The employer-friendly legal regime underpins sectors such as profes-
sional services, wholesale commerce, hotels and restaurants, construc-
tion, and transportation and communications. Together, these sectors 
represent about 35% of the economically active population.215 Even 
though these sectors are regulated by the same statute and, thus, the 
same formal law as the employee-friendly regime, they enjoy consider-
ably more flexibility. This flexibility comes from the operation of law in 
action, rather than from the formally recognized law. 
Commerce and services alone employ about 60% of the economically 
active population.216 But these sectors are broad categories that aggre-
gate very diverse economic activities where different labor relations 
prevail. It is therefore useful to distinguish between wholesale and retail 
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commerce and between professional and personal services.217 Profes-
sional services include administration, accounting, financial, legal, in-
formation technology, marketing, and media businesses. It is also useful 
to look at firm size, which is generally a good indicator of job perma-
nence, with big firms more likely to formally hire employees on a per-
manent basis.218 If we follow these distinctions, it can be inferred that a 
segment of the service sector related to big firms and to professional 
services operates in the ideal Type II (employer-friendly), while person-
al services and small firms are more likely to operate in an ideal Type 
III (free-for-all) labor regime. For commerce, wholesalers and big firms 
are more likely to operate in the employer-friendly regime, while small 
firms and retail commerce are more likely to exist in the free-for-all re-
gime. 
Wholesale commerce and professional services have among the 
highest rates of salaried labor in the country with 69% and 84% respec-
tively in 2003.219 In contrast, retail commerce and personal service cate-
gories have the highest proportion of self-employed workers in these 
sectors with 29% and 33%, respectively. Unpaid work is also high in re-
tail commerce, reaching 10%, behind only hotels and restaurants.220 
High levels of self-employment and unpaid work are usually a good in-
dicator of informality associated with the free-for-all regime. 
In addition, firms tend to be larger and concentrate a greater propor-
tion of employment in wholesale commerce and professional services 
than in retail commerce and personal services. In 2003, large firms 
(those with more than one-hundred employees) employed 42% of work-
ers in big commerce and 56% in professional services.221 In the service 
sector, big firms comprise activities such as real estate leasing, finan-
cial, educational, health, and recreational services. In contrast, firms of 
up to five employees provided 65% of the jobs in small commerce and 
79% in personal services.222 In the service sector, smaller firms are 
usually in the business of repair and household tasks. 
Even when jobs in the employer-friendly regime may be formally 
permanent, they are dramatically flexible in terms of benefits, working 
hours, and wages. Real wages have declined substantially in these sec-
tors as well. For their part, working hours have shown considerable var-
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iation. Indeed, a substantial proportion of employees work way below or 
above the average hours per week. At one extreme, working hours have 
increased significantly, with more than a fifth of urban employees work-
ing more than forty-eight hours a week.223 At the other extreme, about 
7% of urban employees work less than fifteen hours a week, a characte-
ristic scenario for women working in the commerce and service sec-
tors.224 This reflects the ability of employers to establish different kinds 
of working schedules and to hire part-time employees. 
Moreover, many workers with permanent jobs in these sectors have 
no access to health care, social security, paid vacations, or other non-
wage benefits established by law. The percentage of employees not re-
ceiving the legally mandated benefits has remained high in the last two 
decades, and more than a fifth of all entitled employees receive no bene-
fits.225 Of all salaried workers in 2009, 46.5% had no access to health 
institutions, and 40% had no benefits.226 To further illustrate this phe-
nomenon, consider that of all salaried jobs generated between 2000 and 
2004, about 2,803,908—62%—enjoyed no benefits.227 Of that percen-
tage, 49% of employees had only a verbal contract, a signal for nonper-
manent jobs despite the labor law’s mandate for permanency of em-
ployment relationships without written contract.228 The difference 
between these two figures implies that 13% of employees with written 
contracts, employed under a permanent basis, still enjoyed no bene-
fits.229 The decline in the protection of employees’ entitlement to living 
wages, working hours limits, and indicates considerable employer flex-
ibility with regard to the use of labor and employment costs. 
3. The Free-for-all Regime 
The free-for-all labor regime includes sectors like personal services, 
retail commerce, food preparation and sale on the streets, and domestic 
services. These sectors operate in what is often considered the informal 
economy. Although estimates about the size of the informal economy 
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vary (partly due to differing conceptions of informality), this part of the 
economy employs nearly half the country’s labor force.230 
This regime includes firms that are not registered under the relevant 
administrative regulations and thus operate extra-legally, escaping the 
gamut of regulations ranging from tax, health and safety, and social se-
curity to labor laws. In contrast, the employee-friendly regime above in-
cludes registered firms that often skirt their labor law obligations. While 
employees seldom exercise their labor rights and settle for much less of 
their entitlement’s value, they could still exert legal pressure on the em-
ployer. In addition, employees may enjoy the protection of the firm’s 
compliance with other regulations such as health and safety. 
On the contrary, in the free-for-all regime, parties operate outside the 
purview of the typical labor rights and administrative regulations. Par-
ties can exercise pressure on one another as they see fit, and are limited 
only by the background norms of contract, property, torts and criminal 
law, to which they rarely resort. 
Many workers in the informal economy are self-employed, but there 
are also a considerable number of salaried workers. Indeed, the firms 
that comprise this informal economy are mostly managed by self-
employed individuals who often employ relatives.231 Most of the em-
ployees in the informal economy work in small and micro enterprises 
with five or fewer employees.232 These firms have very small levels of 
investment and productivity, and the average income of employees is 
low.233 
Self-employment has become a pillar of the economy: of all jobs 
created between 2001 and 2004, 54% consisted of salaried jobs, 4% 
were employers, and about 42% consisted of self-employed jobs.234 The 
role played by microenterprises in job creation has reached unprece-
dented levels. These firms created 72% of all jobs in this period, and 
were responsible for 54% of newly created salaried jobs.235 
Jobs in the informal economy, however, are not generally a cause for 
celebration. Jobs in informal firms are often precarious, characterized 
by low wages, no benefits and even unpaid work. This type of employ-
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ment rises as growth levels in the country remain low or decrease, im-
plying that this type of employment is not very productive.236  
It should be noted that the standard view advanced by DB that the in-
formal economy is the product of rigid labor regulations has been se-
riously challenged. According to this view, the high barriers erected by 
rigid hiring and firing rules, as well as generous working conditions, ex-
clude workers currently outside formal employment and condemn them 
to the informal economy. Studies of informality have shown, however, 
that contrary to this standard assumption, there is a great degree of mo-
bility between the formal and informal sectors.237 Workers enter and ex-
it the formal economy with relative ease, casting doubts on the firmness 
of the supposed barriers. Thus, the claim advanced by DB that informal-
ity can be eliminated simply by making labor regulation more flexible is 
rendered illusory.238 
These studies show that the complex incentives that make rational 
firms and entrepreneurs work in, or contribute to the growth of, the in-
formal economy have deeper roots, such as the form of a country’s so-
cial insurance, its relationship to formal employment, and the interac-
tion between different programs of social security.239 
Moreover, in Mexico, the nonwage costs of firing and severance pay 
regulations represent about 3.2.% of wages, compared with 39.5% of 
social security contributions.240 This contrast points to social security as 
a considerably more important source of informality than firing regula-
tions.241 Accordingly, it underscores the importance of looking at the la-
bor market and the laws that constitute it in a comprehensive way. 
The following chart illustrates the three labor regimes described 
alongside the economic sectors and the percentage of the labor force 
each of these regimes comprises. This is a preliminary attempt to cap-
ture the coexistence of these legal regimes and their relation to econom-
ic life. 
 
                                                          
236. Id. at 136–37. 
237. See Maloney, supra note 125, at 1159–60, 1173. See also LEVY, supra note 230, at 85–
129. 
238. See LEVY, supra note 230, at 39 (pointing out that even under full labor mobility there 
will always be an informal sector because some economic activities are more efficient under in-
formal arrangements). 
239. See generally id. 
240. Id. at 25. 
241. Id. at 45. 
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TABLE 3: COEXISTING LABOR LEGAL REGIMES242 
 
NAME SECTORS % TOTAL LABOR 
FORCE 
I. Employee-
friendly 
Manufacturing 
Extractive industries 
Electricity  
20% 
 
II. Employer-
friendly 
Professional services 
Wholesale commerce 
Hotels and restaurants 
Construction 
Transportation and communications 
35% 
III. Free-for-
all  
Personal services 
Retail commerce 
Food preparation and sale on the streets 
Domestic services 
45% 
C. The Problems with DB in Light of the New Framework 
The importance of this analytical and descriptive task will become 
clear by focusing on what DB proposes and what the possible effects of 
the proposals might be when analyzed in light of the ideal types. The 
existence of multiple labor regimes in different sectors of the economy 
means that the proposals for flexibilization will have an asymmetrical 
impact on employees and employers, depending on what sector and 
which labor regime the reforms affect. DB recommends that Mexico 
make its labor regulation more flexible in order to attract capital in-
vestment and foster economic development.243 According to DB, this 
change would create more jobs, reduce the duration of unemployment, 
increase investment in research and technology, increase firms’ produc-
tivity, and ultimately lead to economic growth.244 
Given that a large portion of the labor market, namely, the employer-
friendly and the free-for-all regimes, is supported by already-flexible la-
bor relations, the main target for reform would be the employee-friendly 
regime. According to the DB proposal, this should be converted into an 
employer-friendly regime. 
                                                          
242. This Table reflects the author’s own estimates, which are based on the Employment and 
Occupational Strategic Indicators, INDICADORES, supra note 262; LEVY, supra note 230; Galván 
& Tilly, supra note 216; Salas & Zepeda, Empleo, supra note 184; and Salas & Zepeda, Ocupa-
ción, supra note 227. Estimates may vary but it is clear that the majority of the economically acti-
ve population already works under flexible labor relations, in the DB sense. 
243. This is a recommendation to all countries across the board. DOING BUSINESS 2004, su-
pra note 41, at 35–38. 
244. Id. 
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To see the potential effects of such reform, we look at sectors in the 
employee-friendly regime: manufacturing, extractive industries, and 
electricity. Although labor relations differ by firm size and economic 
activity, these sectors have the most rigid employment relations in Mex-
ico. The vast majority of their workers are employed on a permanent 
basis—job tenure—and enjoy mandatory conditions such as maximum 
number of hours per workweek, premium for overtime work, restric-
tions on night work and holiday work, paid leaves and holidays, and 
minimum wage. So, we begin to see that contrary to DB, which gives 
the impression that its reforms concern the whole economy, only a slice 
of the economy would be targeted. In addition, once we look to the op-
eration of the law in action, we realize that DB is suggesting flexibiliza-
tion in a sector that has already experienced a dramatic fall in real wag-
es and should have already seen benefits in productivity and growth. 
The DB claim that increased employer-side flexibility would create 
jobs and increase output assumes that the demand for labor is quite elas-
tic. The economic sectors under analysis are in fact quite capital inten-
sive, however, with labor costs representing a small share of the total 
cost of production, and often with fixed capital costs. When the share of 
labor costs—such as wages and labor protections—in the firm’s total 
costs is small, the labor demand tends to be inelastic. Under this scena-
rio a decrease in labor costs, due to more flexible regulation, is unlikely 
to have a significant impact on job creation.245 
Even if cheaper labor costs may create a limited number of jobs in 
these industries, these may come at the expense of a significant deteri-
oration of wages and working conditions. Given fixed capital costs and 
a small share of labor in total costs, lower wages and labor benefits may 
not guarantee higher overall productivity. Moreover, even if we were to 
see an increase in productivity, past experiences with productivity in-
creases due to lowered wages do not confirm the link between higher 
productivity and job creation.246 We can only see this by matching the 
                                                          
245. See, e.g., GEORGE FARKAS & PAULA ENGLAND, INDUSTRIES, FIRMS, AND JOBS: 
SOCIOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC APPROACHES (1988) (expounding the Hicks-Marshall laws of 
elasticity of demand for labor). For empirical evidence that the effects of labor regulation on 
capital-intensive industries may be quite different from those on labor-intensive industries, see 
Ahmad Ahsan & Carmen Pages, Are All Labor Regulations Equal? Evidence from Indian 
Manufacturing, 37 J. COMP. ECON. 62, 71–75 (2009). 
246. The physical volume of manufacturing output in Mexico increased considerably in the 
late twentieth century. However, this productivity increase has not had an impact on employment 
levels. In the year 2000, employment levels had not recovered from 1993 levels, despite signifi-
cant growth in the maquiladora industry in the same period. Lower levels of employment can be 
attributed to an increase in labor productivity, which grew 46.3% from 1993 to 2000, massive 
layoffs in the non-maquiladora manufacturing sectors due to an increase in competition from im-
ports, and dismemberment of chains of production in the domestic market. See De la Garza Tole-
do, supra note 127, at 254–55. In the U.S. automobile industry, for instance, Detroit’s Big Three 
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employee-friendly regime with the specific sector it regulates and look-
ing at the operation of the law in action, not by treating it in the abstract. 
Further, the high turnover rate in these sectors indicates that econom-
ic incentives (wages and benefits) are not high enough to retain em-
ployees from moving to other, less protected sectors. This phenomenon 
suggests that firms are losing their investment in workers’ training, a 
loss that may be accelerated, rather than reduced, if labor relations are 
made more flexible. Fewer incentives for job stability and benefits in 
these sectors may increase turnover, pushing current employees to work 
in the informal sector or to migrate north to the United States. 
Moreover, it is often the case that in these sectors, both firms and 
employees prefer stable long-term relationships to flexible ones. Even if 
labor regulation were relaxed, employers still might prefer to keep sta-
ble relationships. In fact, the coexistence of the employee-friendly and 
employer-friendly regimes in the Mexican labor market seems to sug-
gest that there is much more employer agency involved in this regula-
tion than we would understand from reading the DB reports.247 Recent 
reforms in Argentina and Brazil offer comparative support for this sug-
gestion. Changes to the labor laws in the 1990s introduced atypical em-
ployment contracts such as temporary and fixed-term contracts, but sev-
eral years after the reforms, employers in the employee-friendly regime 
have made relatively little use of these new types of contracts.248 
Assuming substantial economic activity in sectors where labor could 
substitute for capital, cheaper labor would probably increase investment 
in labor relative to capital. In this scenario, increased productivity would 
come as a result of cheaper labor, not more investment in capital goods. 
It is unclear, then, how more flexibility would encourage higher invest-
ment in technology and research and development, as DB claims it 
would. 
                                                                                                                                      
manufacturers (Ford, General Motors, and Daimler-Chrysler) employ 15% fewer workers than a 
decade ago and half the number they employed forty years ago. Posting of Robert Reich, The Fu-
ture of American Auto Making, http://robertreich.blogspot.com/ (Sept. 18, 2006, 20:47 PST). 
247. As Katherine Stone has documented, from the early twentieth century up to the 1970s, 
firms in the United States—especially in the manufacturing sector—created internal labor mar-
kets, characterized by secure, life-tenured jobs, with stable wages, internal job promotion ladders, 
and welfare benefits. What is striking is that these firms, which built their labor relations into the 
prototype employee-friendly regime, did so under an at-will legal framework. STONE, supra note 
6, at 51–63. Renowned economists like Gary Becker and Oliver Williamson have accounted for 
this regime as an economically rational decision on the part of employers, who were trying to 
prevent turnover, to stimulate in-the-firm training, facilitate knowledge transfer, and increase 
productivity. See GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL 29–51 (3d ed. 1993); OLIVER E. 
WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL 
CONTRACTING 249 (1985). 
248. Bensusán, La Distancia, supra note 136, at 123–24. 
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We can now use this same framework to analyze DB’s claim that 
countries should bring their informal sectors into the formal economy 
by turning the informal sector into an employer-friendly regime. To see 
the potential effects of such a reform, we look now at the sectors that 
comprise the free-for-all regime: commerce, food preparation and sell-
ing in the streets, repair shops, and domestic services. The claim for 
conversion to a formalized legal regime is that such a regime would 
guarantee tax payment, and that workers would be better off because 
they would have health insurance and other nonwage benefits that are 
unavailable in the free-for-all regime.249 
The lack of benefits, however, is one of the reasons why the employ-
er-friendly regime is more flexible and less costly for employers than 
the employee-friendly regime. So, it is hard to see the benefits that 
workers would gain if an employer-friendly regime replaced a free-for-
all regime. In short, DB makes two simultaneous claims: it argues that 
employer-friendly regimes should be substituted for employee-friendly 
ones in order to make labor less costly (through part-time, temporary 
contracts, and less benefits), and that the free-for-all regime should also 
be replaced with an employer-friendly regime so that unprotected em-
ployees get benefits.250 Taken together, these simultaneous claims seem 
contradictory. 
Moreover, one might expect that many of the activities currently un-
dertaken in the labor free-for-all regime, characteristic of the informal 
economy, would evaporate if obliged to operate in the formal economy. 
In many cases, they would simply not be profitable. What makes these 
activities profitable is precisely that they operate at the margins, profit-
ing from some public service or private right upon which they can free-
ride. Indeed, it has been documented that most of these microfirms con-
stitute more a strategy of subsistence and survival than a productive en-
terprise. The challenge seems to lie not in formalizing survival strate-
gies, but in creating productive alternatives that would make these 
strategies unnecessary and unprofitable. 
The following chart summarizes the multiple coexisting legal re-
gimes and possible resulting changes with DB flexibility reform. 
                                                          
249. DOING BUSINESS 2004, supra note 41, at xv. 
250. Id. at 37. 
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TABLE 4: DOING BUSINESS FLEXIBILITY REFORM OF LEGAL REGIMES 
 
LABOR REGIME 1. EMPLOYEE-
FRIENDLY 
2. EMPLOYER-
FRIENDLY 
3. FREE-FOR-
ALL 
DB characteriza-
tion Rigid Flexible Unregulated 
DB proposed 
reform 
Move from  
Employee-friendly
→→→→ 
to Employer-
friendly 
Goal 
Move from  
Free-for-all  
←←←← 
to Employer-
friendly 
DB recommended 
action Deregulate Recognize Formalize 
 
DB has also emphasized creating the appropriate investment climate 
in developing countries through a series of legal reforms to entice for-
eign capital.251 The DB insistence on making labor regimes flexible 
shares that objective. As the Mexico example demonstrates, however, 
many of the industries under the rigid/employee-friendly regime seem 
to be in the vanguard economy, and already enjoy cheap labor costs and 
high levels of productivity. It is unlikely that further incremental gains 
in productivity would viably result from worsening working conditions 
or decreasing wages. Absent from DB are the upsides of an employee-
friendly regime, in terms of cooperation, human capital investment, and 
important potential increases in productivity. 
The authors of DB have not targeted organizational flexibility. They 
are not advising firms on new modes of production and flexible man-
agement techniques to stimulate innovation and productivity. This effort 
would aim at gaining flexibility not through cheap labor, but through 
organizational and technological innovations. Studies of the Mexican 
labor markets suggest that although many successful firms already en-
joy considerably cheap labor and a moderately flexible legal regime, 
they are quite rigid in their management and organization of production. 
Many firms are still organized in a Fordist model of production, with 
vertical hierarchical relations and very little worker involvement in task 
design and decision making. This aspect—organizational flexibility—
seems both most promising and largely unexplored. 
Pushing for organizational flexibility might require changes in the la-
bor law regime as well, but those changes would be tied to a vision 
                                                          
251. Even if these reforms do not actually entice foreign capital, hopes are that the reforms 
will at least not block foreign investment. See DOING BUSINESS 2004, supra note 41, at 67. 
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about what firms are doing to innovate production processes and in-
crease output. In its present form, the agenda of labor flexibility consti-
tutes no more than a plea to give more power to employers and, thereby, 
to cheapen labor. It does not convincingly show why moving in that di-
rection would produce the desired results. 
Analyzing labor regimes with a framework like the one I propose, 
could give us not only a better descriptive idea of the legal fabric woven 
into a country’s economy, but also a better sense of the potential effects 
of the reforms prescribed. The DB program, interesting as it is, actually 
takes us away from policy questions and the hard choices we should be 
addressing when thinking about labor regulation. It does this by appeal-
ing to an easy and technical best practice that is not only inaccurate but 
also may not deliver. My project aims at providing some analytical tools 
to mediate between DB’s best practice abstractions and a world of infi-
nite contextual details. 
Recently, the political pressures of the financial crisis seem to have 
done more than either academic critique or even internal critique to 
convince groups inside the World Bank that the DB project is mis-
guided as far as its labor indicators are concerned. As this Article was 
being prepared for publication, the DB group announced forthcoming 
revisions to its methodology, which, if adopted, could constitute a sig-
nificant change of its labor indicators. More specifically, the DB group 
announced that it would revise the DB 2010 report so that countries 
whose labor laws comply with the letter and spirit of the relevant ILO 
conventions would receive favorable scores, thus “recognizing that 
well-designed worker protections are of benefit to society as a 
whole.”252 
The World Bank also declared that “the Employing Workers’ Indica-
tor (EWI) does not represent World Bank policy” and announced the 
removal of the EWI from the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institu-
tional Assessments (CPIA) as a guidepost for reform in its borrowing 
countries.253 This is indeed a significant shift that seems to signal more 
about the financial and political circumstances of the moment than any 
deep reconceptualization of DB’s understanding of labor flexibility and 
its overall project of urging reforms based on these indicators.254 
                                                          
252. World Bank Group, Revisions to the EWI Indicator (released on April 27, 2009), 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/documents/EWI_revisions.pdf (last visited on Sept. 19, 2009) [he-
reinafter Revisions to the EWI Indicator]. 
253. Id. 
254. The hypothesis that political reactions to the financial crisis have forced this dramatic 
turn is further supported by the fact that a 2008 article published by Simeon Djankov, the leader 
of the Doing Business project, advocates flexible labor regulations without mentioning any of the 
ILO core labor standards or otherwise addressing any of the positive externalities of labor regula-
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The revisions by DB seemed to be an anticipated response to the re-
cent explicit repudiation of key DB indicators by the U.S. Congress. On 
June 12, 2009, the House of Representatives passed a supplemental ap-
propriations bill for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2009 directing 
the U.S. Executive Directors at the World Bank to “use the voice and 
vote of the United States to actively promote and work to achieve” the 
following goals: (1) the suspension of the Employing Workers Indicator 
as a tool for ranking country performance in the DB report; (2) the eli-
mination of the Labor Tax and Social Contribution Subindicator from 
the DB report; and (3) the removal of the Employing Workers’ Indicator 
as a “guidepost for calculating the annual Country Policy and Institu-
tional Assessment Score for each recipient country.”255 
 It is worth noting that the bill has pushed the World Bank, and more 
particularly the authors of the DB report, to at least formally recognize 
the potential positive effects of labor regulations on private investment. 
It has also encouraged DB to look at regulation according to countries’ 
context and to collaborate with the ILO, private companies, and un-
ions.256 
Perhaps not surprisingly, given U.S. economic and political pressure, 
DB has acted promptly on each of the fronts highlighted by the House 
bill and has promised changes in the upcoming DB report. According to 
its recent memo, the new DB report will make clear that the EWI “does 
not represent World Bank policy and should not be used as a basis for 
policy advice or in any country program documents that outline or eva-
luate the development strategy or assistance program for a recipient 
country.”257 The memo announced that the Bank “will convene a work-
ing group including representatives from the ILO, . . . trade unions, 
businesses, academics and legal experts.”258 This is an important 
change, brought about by successful pressure, and it is certainly not the 
way the DB group is used to “doing business.” 
                                                                                                                                      
tions that the group seems to be subscribing to in the announced change. See Simeon Djankov & 
Rita Maria Ramalho, The Regulation of Labor in Developing Countries (2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1162238. 
255. H.R. REP. NO. 111-151, at 44–45 (2009). 
256. Accordingly, the House has instructed the U.S. representatives at the Bank to seek the 
suspension of the Employing Workers’ Indicator “until a set of indicators can be devised that fair-
ly represent the value of internationally recognized workers’ rights, including core labor stan-
dards, in creating a stable and favorable environment for attracting private investment.” Id. at 45. 
These indicators should take into account the experiences of the Bank member governments in 
“dealing with the economic, social and political complexities of labor market issues.” Id. Finally, 
the new indicators “should be developed through collaborative discussions with and between the 
World Bank, the International Finance Corporation, the International Labor Organization, private 
companies, and labor unions.” Id. 
257. Revisions to the EWI Indicator, supra note 252. 
258. Id. 
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I do not mean to suggest that the withdrawal of these indicators is 
solely the result of the present political circumstances. Criticism of DB 
has become more visible only in recent years, both in the academy and 
policy debates, but it has been mounting for some time.259 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, I develop an alternative analytical framework for 
thinking about labor regulation and its relationship to economic devel-
opment. In my framework, I construct three regulatory types that reflect 
several labor regimes already in operation. Each of these labor regimes, 
which I call employer-friendly, employee-friendly, and free-for-all, 
combines flexibilities and rigidities in a variety of ways. This frame-
work exhibits several advantages over the traditional flexibility-rigidity 
model. First, this framework calls for a description that takes into ac-
count not only the law on the books, but also the law’s actual effects. 
Second, the framework moves beyond the prevailing flexibility-
rigidity dichotomy, illuminating the relational character of flexibility. 
While law creates entitlements that seem flexible for some parties in the 
employment relationship, these same entitlements are experienced as 
rigid by others. I argue that, contrary to this unstated assumption in the 
literature, we cannot deem a given labor regulation to be more rigid or 
flexible overall. My framework is attentive to the distributional charac-
ter of labor flexibility. 
Third, this framework provides a more contextual approach, calling 
for an analysis of the relationship between these multiple labor regimes 
and economic life. It examines the economic sectors that these different 
regimes underpin, the size and composition of the labor force, and the 
contribution of the different labor regimes to the economy as a whole. 
For these reasons, the framework I have developed provides a better 
analytical tool to describe and assess countries’ labor regimes. In addi-
tion, it can also help to clarify the potential impact of currently proposed 
labor flexibility reforms. It helps underscore that these reforms can af-
fect established labor regimes asymmetrically, with distinct conse-
quences for workers and firms operating in different sectors of the 
                                                          
259. Perhaps no other group has been more steady and vocal in its criticism of the DB indica-
tors than the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC). See ITUC, Onlines: ITUC Wel-
comes World Bank’s Suspension of “Doing Business” Labour Indicator, http://www.ituc-
csi.org/spip.php?article3505 (last visited Sept. 19, 2009). Thus, the Bank’s repudiation of the DB 
labor indicators can be read as the result of direct political pressure from the U.S. Congress, 
enabled by a successful strategy by the ITUC, the AFL-CIO, and other interested parties. This 
pressure has no doubt been made possible by the coincidence of a Democratic Congress and the 
reputational damage that the current economic crisis has inflicted upon market deregulation theo-
ries as the orthodox solution to economic problems. 
2009] LABOR FLEXIBILITY 105 
economy. Ultimately, this framework could help to clarify the plausibil-
ity of proposed reforms in terms of their contribution to productivity 
and economic growth. 
I have developed this framework in contrast to the Doing Business 
proposal for making labor law regimes more flexible. At first, DB 
seems rather appealing. It suggests that by changing labor regulations to 
make them less rigid, a country can create more jobs, reduce the dura-
tion of unemployment, increase productivity and ultimately achieve 
economic growth. The project uses rankings suggesting that the most 
economically successful countries all have flexible labor regimes and 
that countries with rigid labor regulations do not fare as well. Thus, the 
reforms for labor flexibility seem promising as a strategy for economic 
development. These reform proposals currently enjoy not only the 
World Bank’s support, but also the enthusiastic endorsement of the big-
gest development assistance donors. 
Nevertheless, appealing as DB may seem, it relies on seriously 
flawed assumptions about law and its operation. From the point of view 
of legal scholarship, the methodology faces significant criticism. DB’s 
coding of labor regulatory regimes across countries relies primarily on 
formal law—the law as it is found in codes and statutes. In understand-
ing a legal regime in operation, legal theory and legal sociology have 
long made us aware of the importance of accounting for the full range 
of formal legal sources, law in action, and informal norms. In this Ar-
ticle, I have shown how these insights remain largely overlooked by 
DB, which seriously undermines DB’s descriptive account of countries’ 
regulations, and consequently the power of its comparative analysis. 
Furthermore, I argue that even if we took these elements into consid-
eration in an effort to improve the DB work, the linear flexibility-
rigidity index would still face very important limitations. The most im-
portant limitation is that this model does not account for, and indeed ob-
scures, the coexistence of multiple labor regimes within a single econ-
omy that underpin different sectors of a country’s labor market. 
Countries regulate their labor markets differently. The rich North Atlan-
tic democracies, which achieved remarkable economic success during 
the twentieth century, exhibit a contrasting array of labor and employ-
ment rules and institutions. These countries have combined crucial cha-
racteristics of labor regulation, such as security and flexibility, in a va-
riety of ways. Undoubtedly, there is much to learn from these 
experiences, but under the DB analytical framework, the existence of 
such regulatory variation becomes obscured, and its relation to econom-
ic and social outcomes harder to assess. 
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My hope is that by using the analytical framework I have developed, 
we can study how such countries have combined their different labor 
regimes, as well as the size and distribution of these regimes, across var-
ious sectors of their economies. Learning from these countries’ expe-
riences, this analysis can lay the groundwork for context-specific regu-
latory strategies. 
